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THE LOST PROMISE OF ARBITRATION
Sarah Rudolph Cole*
ABSTRACT
This article disputes the notion that arbitration, a historically informal
process, tends to disadvantage minority disputants or provide them with
quick decisions tainted by prejudice.  Responding to Richard Delgado’s
seminal work, Fairness and Formality: Minimizing the Risk of Prejudice
in Alternative Dispute Resolution, this article attempts to shed greater
light on the benefits of modern arbitration for minority disputants. Al-
though still capable of improvement, arbitration may well provide greater
protections to minority disputants than does litigation.  Since Delgado first
wrote his article, the use of arbitration as a primary dispute resolution
mechanism has increased dramatically, particularly among businesses and
employers.  As arbitration expanded, critics of the informal process
worked to reform arbitration so that it provided sufficient protection to
disputants who were compelled to use it. Modern arbitration provides a
more formalized and structured process that resembles litigation, but con-
tinues to offer resolution more efficiently and cheaply.  Assuming Del-
gado’s premise—that formality matters in promoting equality in dispute
resolution—arbitration’s enhanced formalism suggests significant promise
for reformers who seek to improve minorities’ fair and effective representa-
tion in dispute resolution.  This article opens the dialogue for further inno-
vation by proposing impactful changes to the arbitration process.  These
reforms would include such improvements as mandatory reasoned opin-
ion-writing and greater diversity in arbitrator appointments.  In turn, these
process-based reforms would enhance arbitration’s formalism and thereby
improve its protection for minority disputants and any other party likely to
be at a disadvantage in a dispute resolution venue.  This contemporary per-
spective on arbitration fosters a fair and equitable dispute resolution mech-
anism for those with less bargaining power than their opponents.
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I. INTRODUCTION
IN his seminal article, Fairness and Formality: Minimizing the Risk ofPrejudice in Alternative Dispute Resolution,1 Richard Delgado andhis co-authors posit that formal dispute resolution processes, like tri-
als, offer a preferable forum for minority disputants, particularly in dis-
putes involving an opponent2 of higher status or power.3 Delgado
theorized that the formalism associated with the trial process reduces the
risk that parties who hold prejudicial attitudes will act on them.4 By con-
trast, in informal processes, an opponent of higher status or power is
more likely to act on its prejudices, placing minority disputants at a
greater disadvantage than they would experience in traditional litigation.5
In drawing this conclusion, Delgado includes a wide variety of dispute
1. Richard Delgado, Chris Dunn, Pamela Brown, Helena Lee & David Hubbert,
Fairness and Formality: Minimizing the Risk of Prejudice in Alternative Dispute Resolution,
1985 WIS. L. REV. 1359 (1985).
2. Delgado’s primary concern appears to be the possibility that an opponent with
higher status and power is more likely to act on his or her prejudices in an informal setting
than a formal one. Yet the formality of the courtroom not only suppresses an opponent’s
willingness to act on his prejudices, but also decreases the likelihood that the neutral third
party will act in a biased or prejudiced manner. Id. at 1374–75.
3. Id. at 1403 (arguing that to protect minorities, dispute resolution processes should
be limited to disputes among parties with relatively similar status and power).
4. Id. at 1368–75.
5. Id. at 1402–03. Delgado cites the leftist critique of ADR, whose commentators
conclude that informalism is problematic because it “(i) solidifies control by capital and the
state; (ii) disadvantages ‘weaker’ parties; (iii) expands state control [over members of dis-
advantaged classes]; (iv) deflects energy away from collective action; and (v) promotes law
without justice.” Id. at 1391.
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resolution processes within the category of “informal processes.”6 As de-
fined by Delgado, the principal dispute resolution mechanisms are “arbi-
tration, mediation, small claims courts, community justice centers, media
complaint boards, and internal institutional grievance mechanisms.”7 He
describes these processes, including arbitration, as a “loose collection of
deformalized, decentralized procedures . . . offering speedy, non-intimi-
dating, flexible justice for the common person, the litigant of modest
means or one whose claim is so small it cannot be processed economically
in court.”8 Delgado defines arbitration separately in the article only once,
referring to it as a “process disputants have used for years in an effort to
circumvent the court system’s costly delays and congested dockets. In ar-
bitration, disputants submit their disagreement to an impartial third party
and agree to be bound by the arbitrator’s decision, a decision that a court
may enforce.”9
While this definition of arbitration is largely accurate, Delgado’s inclu-
sion of arbitration in the array of informal dispute resolution processes
may have, without justification, increased disputants’ distrust and suspi-
cion of the arbitration process. In this Article, I dispute the notion that
arbitration is truly an informal process that tends to disadvantage minor-
ity disputants or provide them with a “quick, painless hearing that ren-
ders an adverse decision tainted by prejudice.”10 Arbitration, unlike
mediation and negotiation, offers considerable promise to minority dispu-
tants facing a well-heeled opponent in a dispute. This is because arbitra-
tion has been—and continues to be—a structured process that, over the
years since Delgado first wrote his article, has become increasingly for-
mal. Even under Delgado’s views about the import of informality, arbi-
tration’s formalism may make it a more attractive venue for minority and
other disputants who might be at a disadvantage when confronted by an
opponent of higher status than other informal dispute resolution mecha-
nisms. That is not to say that there is no room for improvement. Assum-
ing Delgado is correct that formality matters in promoting equality in
dispute resolution, reformers could easily take steps to formalize arbitra-
tion even more, thereby improving its attractiveness as a venue for mi-
nority disputants vis-a`-vis mediation or negotiation or even, for that
matter, litigation. In this Article, I hope to shed greater light on the bene-
fits of arbitration as a formalized process likely to offer considerable pro-
tection to minority disputants. In addition, I will address changes to the
arbitration process, including mandatory reasoned opinion writing and
greater diversity in arbitrator appointments, that could offer all dispu-
tants an opportunity to have their voices heard in a fair and effective
forum.
6. Id. at 1353.
7. Id.
8. Id. at 1360.
9. Id. at 1363.
10. Id. at 1402.
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This Article proceeds as follows. First, I summarize Delgado’s views on
the values of formalism versus informalism in terms of protection of the
minority disputant. Relying on that dichotomy, I will offer what I believe
to be a more accurate picture of arbitration as a largely formal process
and explain why arbitration’s formalism offers virtually the same protec-
tions to minority disputants as does the traditional litigation process.
Then, I will discuss potential reforms to the arbitration process that will
provide greater formalism, and therefore protection, not only to the mi-
nority disputant but also to any party who is likely to be at a disadvantage
in a dispute resolution venue. In this way, I hope to offer a rosier picture
of the role of this form of dispute resolution in promoting equality—re-
considering arbitration’s lost promise as a dispute resolution mechanism
for those with less bargaining power than their opponents.
A. FORMALISM’S BENEFITS FOR MINORITY DISPUTANTS
Delgado’s 1985 article offered a critique of dispute resolution mecha-
nisms that served to tamp down some of the initial enthusiasm for these
informal processes.11 Delgado certainly recognized some of the benefits
of informal dispute resolution processes, including lower costs, lack of
administrative complexity, greater accessibility, and capacity to allow par-
ties to resolve their disputes more creatively than in litigation.12 Yet, Del-
gado expressed concern about increasing the use of these processes, citing
various social-psychological theories of prejudice that, he believed, would
11. See id. at 1361–67. Professor Frank E.A. Sander first articulated the “multi-door”
courthouse concept at the 1976 Pound Conference convened by Chief Justice Warren Bur-
ger to address the problems faced by judges in the administration of justice and to call for
the institutionalization of ADR within the United States legal system. See Frank E.A.
Sander, Professor of Law, Harvard Univ., Varieties of Dispute Processing, Address at the
National Conference on the Causes of Dissatisfaction with the Administration of Justice
(Apr. 7–9, 1976), in 70 F.R.D. 79, 130–31 (1976); Warren E. Burger, Chief Justice, U.S.
Supreme Court, Agenda for 2000 A.D.—A Need for Systematic Anticipation, Keynote Ad-
dress at the National Conference on the Causes of Dissatisfaction with the Administration
of Justice (Apr. 7–9, 1976), in 70 F.R.D. 79, 93–96 (1976) (suggesting alternatives to litiga-
tion); see also Warren E. Burger, Chief Justice, U.S. Supreme Court, Isn’t There a Better
Way?, Address at the American Bar Association Midyear Meeting (Jan. 24, 1982), in 68
A.B.A.J. 274, 276–81 (1982) (advocating assessment of alternatives to litigation). In his
address, Professor Sander envisioned a court system that would screen incoming com-
plaints and sort them based on criteria aimed at matching the case with the most appropri-
ate form of resolution. Sander, supra at 130–32. In other words, litigation would be one
option among many “dispute resolution” options, including mediation, arbitration, concili-
ation, and ombudspeople. See id.; see generally Larry Ray & Anne L. Clare, The Multi-
Door Courthouse Idea: Building the Courthouse of the Future . . . Today, 1 OHIO ST. J. ON
DISP. RESOL. 7, 9, 16 (1985) (discussing implementation of Professor Sander’s idea). “Sub-
sequently, the ADR ‘movement’ began to take hold of the legal profession, leading to
widespread court reform and the development within law schools of courses germane to
the practice of ADR.” Valerie A. Sanchez, Back to the Future of ADR: Negotiating Justice
and Human Needs, 18 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 669, 680 (2003). Over the last thirty
years, ADR processes have rapidly been incorporated into policies and procedures to re-
solve conflicts in lieu of traditional court proceedings. See Thomas J. Stipanowich, ADR
and the “Vanishing Trial”: The Growth and Impact of “Alternative Dispute Resolution”, 1 J.
OF EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 843, 843 (2004).
12. Delgado, supra note 1, at 1366–67.
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be more likely to create problems in informal settings than in formal
settings.13
According to Delgado’s research, the risk of prejudice is greatest in
situations where an in-group member confronts an out-group member.14
In this context, an in-group member would be a member of the majority;
an out-group member would be a member of a minority group.15 These
confrontations are particularly problematic when direct, rather than
through intermediaries. Additional problematic factors include a lack of
rules constraining conduct, a closed setting, and a view that “public val-
ues”16 rather than private ones should predominate.17 Delgado also
viewed as problematic those situations where the dispute is personal
rather than impersonal.18 He also proffered the view that minority dispu-
tants feel greater comfort when they believe what they say and do will
make a difference, where the results are predictable and can be traced to
effort and merit.19
In Delgado’s view, a dispute which pits a person of low status and
power against a person of high status and power, in an informal process,
with the characteristics described above, would be quite problematic and
disadvantageous for the low-status disputant.20 In such a setting, formal
adjudication processes would be preferable.21
B. THE CHARACTERISTICS OF FORMAL ADJUDICATION
Delgado emphasizes that formal processes provide a more equal op-
portunity for the minority disputant.22 But what constitutes the kind of
formal process that is more likely to level the playing field for the dispu-
tant? Delgado identifies several characteristics that he and his co-authors
believe result in a fairer forum for adjudicating minority disputants’
claims.23
13. Id. at 1380–84. Delgado suggests that “many factors—personal dynamics,
scapegoating, economic dislocation, power disparities, socialization, and in-group/out-
group cognitive categories—contribute to the development of prejudice.” Id. at 1382. Del-
gado argues that the “American Creed[, which] emphasizes liberty, equality, and human
worth—values that arise from the basic tenets of democratic and Judeo–Christian teach-
ings,” is contradicted by “the reality of class and race-based prejudice [that] exists on a
societal level, where it affects the behavior of groups and institutions.” Id. at 1383. Thus,
people afflicted by prejudice resolve their inner conflict between the “American Creed”
and prejudice in different ways, including: “(1) repression (denial); (2) defense (rationali-
zation); (3) compromise (partial resolution); (4) integration (true resolution).” Id. at 1384.
14. Id. at 1381–82. “‘In-group’ is defined as ‘any cluster of people who can use the
term “we” with the same significance.’ ‘Out-group’ refers to all others.” Id. at 1381 n.161.
15. Id. at 1382.
16. Id. at 1383–84. The “public values” of equality and humanitarianism were first
coined as the “American Creed” by Gunnar Myrdal. (citing GUNNAR MYRDAL, AN AMER-
ICAN DILEMMA 209 (1962)).
17. Delgado, supra note 1, at 1382–83.
18. Id. at 1385–86, 1402–03.
19. Id. at 1402.
20. Id. at 1402–03.
21. Id. at 1403.
22. Id.
23. Id. at 1368–75.
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First and foremost, Delgado asserts that the judge’s position as neutral
arbiter offers significant protections to all litigants, including minority dis-
putants.24 According to Delgado, both internal and external constraints
prevent a judge from exhibiting bias or prejudice.25 Internal constraints
include those emanating from the judge’s professional position.26 The
judge is often appointed for a lengthy term and thus need not be politi-
cally responsive in decisions.27 A judge also agrees to apply a system of
rules, and rule application reduces bias.28 In addition, the repetitive na-
ture of the judge’s caseload dissuades the judge from thinking about par-
ticular parties in a dispute. Instead, the judge can focus purely on the
legal and factual issues presented.29 The system of stare decisis also en-
courages consistent results.30 Finally, Delgado notes, the competitive
presentation of evidence, overseen by the judge, counteracts decision-
making bias and “combats the natural human tendency to ‘judge too
swiftly in terms of the familiar that which is not yet fully known.’”31
Second, external constraints reduce the opportunity for judicial bias.32
The Code of Judicial Conduct, for example, imposes limits on what a
judge may or may not do. For example, citing the Code of Judicial Con-
duct, Delgado notes that a judge must disqualify herself when her impar-
tiality is questioned or when she feels animus or prejudice toward a
party.33
Next, Delgado notes the important role that rules of civil procedure
and evidence play in ensuring a formal, unbiased, and unprejudiced fo-
rum for adjudicating disputes.34 The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,
and their state counterparts, promote fairness and discourage prejudice.35
They also serve to create a level playing field by ensuring that both par-
24. Id. at 1368.
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. Id. at 1368 (citing Owen Fiss, Foreword: The Forms of Justice, The Supreme Court
1978 Term, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1, 14 (1979) (arguing that the federal judiciary is indepen-
dent because of life tenure)). Of course, even federal judges are appointed through a politi-
cal process that might tend to make them vulnerable to political bias. And, of course, many
state court judges are elected, which creates a greater likelihood of bias than does appoint-
ment. Finally, considerable research suggests that judges are never truly as neutral as one
might expect. See generally Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Sheri Lynn Johnson, Andrew J. Wistrich
& Chris Guthrie, Does Unconscious Racial Bias Affect Trial Judges?, 84 NOTRE DAME L.
REV. 1195, 1197 (2009).
28. Delgado, supra note 1, at 1368.
29. Id.
30. Id. (“The doctrine of stare decisis is intended to produce consistent results in simi-
lar cases, and anomalous results can be subjected to appellate review.”).
31. Id. at 1389. Delgado also explains that similar rules control jury prejudice. Id. at
1369. Voir dire and peremptory challenges, despite their potential for exploitation, gener-
ally help to reduce the number of jurors who are biased. Rules protecting juries from
outside influence, such as sequestering or ordering the jury not to discuss the case with
outsiders, also serve to reduce bias within the jury. Id. at 1369–70.
32. Id. at 1368.
33. Id. at 1368–69.
34. Id. at 1370–71.
35. Id. at 1371 (citing Lon L. Fuller, The Forms and Limits of Adjudication, 92 HARV.
L. REV. 353, 364, 369 (1978)).
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ties understand the process and that a trial reaches a resolution on the
basis of merit rather than on a party’s social or economic advantage.36
Delgado focuses on several of these rules as particularly well-suited to
reducing bias. For example, Delgado notes that the rules governing no-
tice37 and timely filing of pleadings help reduce bias by enabling defend-
ants to eliminate frivolous suits early.38 Conversely, the short plain
statement requirement discourages groundless claims motivated by
prejudice.39 The requirement of an attorney’s signature on all pleadings40
is also likely to reduce prejudice because an attorney will only sign the
papers if the attorney believes that the pleading is grounded in fact or law
or, minimally, on a good faith argument for modification of the law.41
Moreover, the parties are less likely to act in a prejudicial manner be-
cause they know the judge will see all of their pleadings and motions.42
This principle applies equally to pretrial orders.43 That the judge will see
all of these pleadings and motions incentivizes parties to avoid drafting or
filing documents based on spite or prejudice.44
The judge’s obligation to state his or her findings of fact and conclu-
sions of law further serves to reduce bias and prejudice.45 The existence
of an appellate review process encourages judges to find facts and law in
an unbiased manner.46 Evidentiary rules also reduce prejudice by limiting
testimony to the issues that the parties present and excluding evidence
designed primarily to inflame the court or jury or to induce prejudice in
36. Id. at 1371 (citing Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 181 (1962) (“It is too late in the
day and entirely contrary to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure for decisions on the
merits to be avoided . . . .”)). Id. (citing Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 48 (1957) (“The
Federal Rules reject the approach that pleading is a game of skill in which one misstep by
counsel may be decisive . . . . [T]he purpose of pleading is to facilitate a proper decision on
the merits.”)).
37. Id. at 1371. Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 3, 4, 5, 6, and 8 provide notice to all
parties, ensuring knowledge of the course of proceedings.
38. Id. (citing FED. R. CIV. P. 3–6, 8). “Rule 3 requires that a complaint be filed to
begin the action. The suit thus becomes a matter of public record and the time of its com-
mencement fixed.” See id. at 1371 n.89 (citing FED. R. CIV. P. 3). “If the claim is stale and
dredged up out of spite or class-based animosity, the defendant can use a statute of limita-
tions defense to have it dismissed. The rules also require service of process within a short
period.” Id. (citing FED. R. CIV. P. 4(a) & 4(j)). “If service is not received, the court must
dismiss.” Id.
39. Id. at 1372.
40. FED. R. CIV. P. 11(a). Rule 11 requires that attorneys attest that papers are not
filed to harass or achieve another improper purpose. FED. R. CIV. P. 11(b).
41. Delgado, supra note 1, at 1372 (discussing FED. R. CIV. P. 11).
42. Id.
43. Id. (citing FED. R. CIV. P. 16(c)(1), Advisory Committee Note); see also Seneca
Nursing Home v. Sec’y of Soc. and Rehab. Servs., 604 F.2d 1309, 1314 (10th Cir. 1979)
(stating that the purpose of the pretrial order is to simplify litigation). Rule 16 mandates a
pretrial conference and order that serve to define litigable issues. FED. R. CIV. P. 16.
44. Delgado, supra note 1, at 1372–73.
45. Id. at 1373 (citing FED. R. CIV. P. 52). Rule 52 requires a court to issue an opinion,
assuring that the decision will be exposed to public scrutiny. FED. R. CIV. P. 52.
46. Delgado, supra note 1, at 1373. Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 59 and 61 provide
for a new trial if error impairs a substantial right of a party. FED. R. CIV. P. 59, 61.
856 SMU LAW REVIEW [Vol. 70
some other way.47
Courtroom formalities also help reduce prejudice. The presence of the
American flag, the judge’s black robe, and other courtroom rituals em-
phasize that higher public values are encouraged.48 At the same time,
these formalities discourage people from acting on their biases and
prejudices, as they would in an informal or intimate setting.49 That “each
party is represented by an attorney and has a prescribed time and manner
for speaking, putting on evidence, and questioning the other side” also
provides the structure needed to reduce bias and prejudice.50 Procedural
and evidentiary rules serve to keep parties separate and provide structure
for interactions.51 Attorneys address the trier of fact rather than each
other.52
Why do these formalities work to reduce bias and limit prejudice? Ac-
cording to Delgado, the formal nature of the courtroom takes advantage
of the human desire to conform.53 The courtroom norms of fairness and
neutrality create a behavioral standard that causes participants to reduce
expressions of prejudice.54 Moreover, the formality of communication in
a courtroom avoids unstructured interactions that social psychologists
have determined are more likely to encourage expressions of prejudice.55
Finally, in the formal context, “prejudiced persons are [less] likely to act
on their beliefs if the [formal courtroom] environment confronts them
with [a] discrepancy between their professed ideals and their personal
hostilities against out-groups.”56 In other words, if people realize that
their beliefs are outside the norm, they will change, or at least suppress,
their views.
Ultimately then, Delgado recommends that persons with low status
and little power, when in conflict with persons of high status or power,
should use an adjudicatory process.57 This recommendation becomes
even stronger “when the issue to be adjudicated touches a sensitive or
47. Delgado, supra note 1, at 1373–74; FED. R. EVID. 403; see also FED. R. EVID. 103
(stating that error occurs when evidence is erroneously admitted that injures a substantial
right of a party).
48. Delgado, supra note 1, at 1388.
49. Id. (explaining that “formal adjudication avoids the unstructured, intimate interac-
tions that, according to social scientists, foster prejudice.”).
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 1387–88, 1395 (“[P]rocedural formality recognizes inequality and attempts to
compensate for it by making both parties conform to the same standards.”) (internal quo-
tation omitted).
54. Id. at 1387–88.
55. Id. at 1388.
56. Id. at 1387. Delgado posits that prejudice tends to be environmental. People will
express prejudice more freely when the setting permits it, or, worse yet, encourages it. In
other words, the venting that might take place in mediation would be more likely to be
hostile or prejudiced toward minority groups because of a lack of safeguards in place to
control such outbursts. In fact, in the mediation setting, venting is often encouraged, mak-
ing more likely, according to Delgado, the articulation of prejudiced or hostile views. Id.
57. Id. at 1403–04.
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intimate area of life” such as housing, inter-neighbor, or family dis-
putes.58 If dispute resolution is needed in this setting, rules governing the
scope and confidentiality of the proceedings, discovery, and form of re-
view are essential to ensuring that the minority disputant is not subject to
intrusive or irrelevant (i.e., biased or prejudiced) inquiries.59 In addition,
in this context, the third-party neutral should be a professional who is
acceptable to both sides, and both sides should be permitted to have an
advocate or attorney present, if they so desire.60
Delgado’s description of formalism is different than the kind of process
offered in traditional arbitration. However, changes in the arbitration
process over the last thirty years paint a more formal picture of the dis-
pute resolution process. The next section will explore whether these
changes offer sufficient protection to the party of low status and power so
that he or she may feel comfortable utilizing the arbitration process.
II. WHAT DOES TRADITIONAL ARBITRATION LOOK LIKE?
As I mentioned at the outset, Delgado’s article focuses primarily on the
benefits and drawbacks of mediation and other non-binding processes for
minority disputants rather than on arbitration.61 Delgado’s limited discus-
sion of arbitration identified it as a speedy process that provides a binding
result issued by an impartial third party, avoiding the delays and costs
associated with the court system.62 This description fits the definition of
“traditional arbitration,” the process typically used by repeat players to
resolve disputes.
As originally envisioned and consistent with Delgado’s description, ar-
bitration was an informal, speedy, and flexible process that enabled a dis-
putant to avoid slow court processes and achieve a final, binding result.63
Merchants, in particular, preferred arbitration because they were inter-
ested in a system that would resolve disputes quickly and in a manner
consistent with industry standards (to facilitate relationships among the
parties).64 “Traditional arbitration, unlike litigation, empowered . . . dis-
putants to appoint a disinterested third party who was an expert in the
industry to resolve the dispute in accordance with understood customary
norms.”65 “Moreover, the arbitral system ensured finality, [viewed as] es-
58. Id. at 1403.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. See generally id. at 1360–61.
62. Id. at 1363.
63. See Sarah Rudolph Cole, Curbing the Runaway Arbitrator in Commercial Arbitra-
tion: Making Exceeding the Powers Count, 68 ALA. L. REV. 179, 184 (2016). See also CPR
COMMISSION ON THE FUTURE OF ARBITRATION, COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION AT ITS BEST:
SUCCESSFUL STRATEGIES FOR BUSINESS USERS 173 (Thomas J. Stipanowich & Peter H.
Kaskell eds., 2001) (explaining that traditional values of arbitration included speed, final-
ity, and party autonomy).
64. Cole, supra note 63, at 186; Paul L. Sayre, Development of Commercial Arbitration
Law, 37 YALE L.J. 595, 597–98 (1928).
65. Cole, supra note 63, at 186; Jeffrey W. Stempel, Pitfalls of Public Policy: The Case
of Arbitration Agreements, 22 ST. MARY’S L.J. 259, 270 (1990).
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sential to facilitating continuing relationships,” because the parties agreed
“to abide by the arbitrator’s resolution of the claim.”66 Judicial review of
arbitration awards was unwanted because the timetable for such review
was inconsistent with the parties’ need for immediate resolution.67 Opin-
ion writing was equally unnecessary because the principles the arbitrator
applied were based on customs and norms that the parties generally un-
derstood.68 Speed and efficiency of award issuance took precedence over
accuracy and reasoning.69
Modern commercial arbitration, among repeat players like businesspe-
ople, remains a flexible process. Parties may, and often do,70 negotiate
multiple aspects of the process, including the location of the hearing; the
availability, types, and amount of discovery; the timetable of events; the
66. Cole, supra note 63, at 187; see also Randy Linda Sturman, House of Judgment:
Alternative Dispute Resolution in the Orthodox Jewish Community, 36 CAL. W. L. REV.
417, 418 (2000) (recognizing that in Bet Din, a form of ADR that allows Jews to resolve
disputes between themselves, parties must sign a contract stating that they agree to abide
by the decision); Lisa Bernstein, Opting Out of the Legal System: Extralegal Contractual
Relations in the Diamond Industry, 21 J. LEGAL STUD. 115, 149 (1992) (noting that the
diamond industry ensures obedience to arbitral awards through reputational sanctions).
67. See Edward Brunet, Replacing Folklore Arbitration with a Contract Model of Arbi-
tration, 74 TUL. L. REV. 39, 45 (1999) (“In historic folklore arbitration, informal proce-
dures dominated. There was little or no discovery. Evidence rules were inapplicable . . . .”).
68. Martin Domke, Gabriel Wilner & Larry E. Edmonson, 2 DOMKE ON COM. ARB.
§ 34:7 (2016) (“[C]ommercial arbitration awards . . . are rarely accompanied by written
opinions.”). Likewise, today, commercial arbitrators are not legally bound to provide writ-
ten substantive awards. See Bernhardt v. Polygraphic Co. of Am., 350 U.S. 198, 204 n.4
(1956) (“[A]rbitrators need not disclose the facts or reasons behind their award.”); United
Steelworkers of Am. v. Enter. Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593, 598 (1960) (“Arbitrators
have no obligation to the court to give their reasons for an award.”). The “no reasoned
award” norm of American commercial arbitration is contrary to the practice in most other
industrialized nations. In most countries, arbitrators are expected, and in many are re-
quired by law, to state their findings of fact and conclusions of law and reveal the manner
in which the facts and the law lead to their determination of the disputes before them. See
Martin Domke, Arbitral Awards Without Written Opinions: Comparative Aspects of Inter-
national Arbitration, in XXTH CENTURY COMPARATIVE AND CONFLICTS LAW 249, 249–50
(Kurt H. Nadelmann et al. eds., 1961).
69. Indeed, the most commonly cited reason for the finality of arbitral awards is that
arbitration is precisely what the parties bargained for. In exchange for a quicker, less ex-
pensive resolution of the dispute, the parties trade away some level of assurance that the
correct result on the merits has been reached. See, e.g., Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler
Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 628 (1985); McIlroy v. PaineWebber, Inc., 989 F.2d
817, 819–20 (5th Cir. 1993); Moncharsh v. Heily & Blase, 832 P.2d 899, 903 (Cal. 1992).
70. My experience as a labor, employment, commercial, and securities arbitrator is
that parties negotiate the amount and timing of discovery as well as the timetable of
events, location of the hearing, and use of briefs. Parties typically have the applicable law
identified in their arbitration agreements, so this issue may, at one time, have been negoti-
ated but is not negotiated at the time the dispute arises. See Lisa B. Bingham, Control Over
Dispute-System Design and Mandatory Commercial Arbitration, 67 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS.
221, 222 (2004); see also AM. ARBITRATION ASS’N (AAA), COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION
RULES AND MEDIATION PROCEDURES 10, 14 (Oct. 1, 2013), https://www.adr.org/sites/de-
fault/files/Commercial%20Rules.pdf [https://perma.cc/T8SJ-XYRL] [hereinafter AAA
COMMERCIAL RULES] (Rule 1, Agreement of Parties; Rule 11, Fixing of Locale); JUDICIAL
ARBITRATION AND MEDIATION SERVS. (JAMS), JAMS COMPREHENSIVE ARBITRATION
RULES & PROCEDURE 7 (July 1, 2014), https://www.jamsadr.com/files/Uploads/Documents/
JAMS-Rules/JAMS_comprehensive_arbitration_rules-2014.pdf [https://perma.cc/JJR8-
N95S] [hereinafter JAMS RULES] (Rule 2, Party Self-Determination and Emergency Re-
lief Procedures).
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appropriateness of expert witnesses; and the use of pre- or post-hearing
briefs. Yet parties tend to rely on institutional rules for many issues, in-
cluding the size of the arbitral panel, the use of procedural rules or evi-
dentiary standards, and whether or not attorneys will represent the
parties.71 These institutional rules reflect the default approach to arbitra-
tion—informality and efficiency.72 Arbitration’s flexibility also enables
parties to exercise considerable control over arbitrator selection.73 Thus,
parties may select an arbitrator who is an expert in the field in which the
dispute has arisen. Moreover, parties can and sometimes do select arbi-
trators who are not lawyers.
Arbitrations among repeat players typically follow a fairly predictable
structure. Most arbitration hearings are confidential.74 The arbitrator
usually opens the arbitration with a recitation of ground rules, followed
71. My arbitral experience suggests that parties commonly adopt existing institutional
rules from a provider organization, like AAA. These rules state that arbitration does not
typically follow rules of procedure and evidence. Also, because the rules assign the number
of arbitrators based on the amount of the claim, the size of the panel is not negotiated.
Finally, parties typically permit the use of a representative and do not limit the type of
representative a party may select.
72. For example, there is no formal analog in commercial arbitration to the pre-trial
motion practice in traditional litigation. This characteristic of the process accounts for a
substantial portion of the cost and time savings that can be realized in arbitration. Rule 10
of the AAA Commercial Arbitration Rules provides for pre-hearing proceedings, includ-
ing a “preliminary hearing.” However, Rule 10 does not expressly contemplate pre-hearing
motions addressing the form and content of the pleadings, questions of proper parties and
jurisdiction, or attempts to avoid a hearing by achieving dismissal as a matter of law or
through an adjudication based on undisputed facts. See AAA COMMERCIAL RULES, supra
note 70, at 14.
73. See Stephen Hayford & Ralph Peeples, Commercial Arbitration in Evolution: An
Assessment and Call for Dialogue, 10 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 343, 362–63 (1995)
(“[I]n most instances, commercial arbitration proceeding[s] [are] governed by the rules of
[a] neutral appointing authority,” such as the AAA or JAMS, which are selected by dispu-
tants “to administer the arbitration tribunal and provide panels of neutrals from which
arbitrators are selected.”). Of course, the parties are free to devise their own mutually
acceptable rules for the arbitration proceeding, select an arbitrator without the assistance
of a neutral appointing authority, or both.
74. In Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. Animalfeeds Int’l Corp., 559 U.S. 662, 685–86 (2010), “Jus-
tice Samuel Alito assumed that confidentiality is a natural and beneficial aspect of bilateral
arbitration proceedings.” Amy J. Schmitz, Assuming Silence in Arbitration, N.J. LAW.
MAG., Apr. 2011, at 13. Although “[a]rbitration is private in that only the parties to the
arbitration agreement, the arbitrators, witnesses, and others that the parties invite, may
attend the proceedings,” it does not receive any statutory confidentiality or secrecy protec-
tions. Id. However, parties often include confidentiality clauses in their arbitration agree-
ments. Id.; see also Richard C. Reuben, Constitutional Gravity: A Unitary Theory of
Alternative Dispute Resolution and Public Civil Justice, 47 UCLA L. REV. 949, 1086 (2000)
(“Privacy can be an important consideration in the decision to waive full-blown trial rights
in favor of the arbitral forum.”); Amy J. Schmitz, Untangling the Privacy Paradox in Arbi-
tration, 54 U. KAN. L. REV. 1211, 1214 (2007) (discussing distinctions between confidential-
ity and privacy in arbitration). But see Eagle v. Fred Martin Motor Co., 809 N.E.2d 1161,
1181 (Ohio Ct. App. 2004) (criticizing private arbitration proceedings because they “pre-
vent the public from discovering . . . acts and practices” violative of consumer protection
statutes); Kloss v. Edward D. Jones & Co., 54 P.3d 1, 8 (Mont. 2002) (asking whether
arbitration proceedings “shrouded in secrecy . . . conceal illegal, oppressive or wrongful
business practices”).
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by each party’s opening statement.75 Next, each party presents witnesses
and other evidence. During the hearing, an arbitrator may ask questions
of the witnesses and attorneys to clarify the evidence. Finally, the arbitra-
tor hears closing statements. In most cases, the arbitrator allows the par-
ties to submit post-hearing briefs that summarize each party’s main
arguments. The arbitrator then issues a written award, commonly with an
accompanying opinion, within the time limit that the parties set. If the
parties have not indicated when the award is due, arbitrators typically
issue awards within a few weeks of the hearing.
When disputants think of arbitration, the process described above is
likely what comes to mind.76 Yet, the arbitration process has changed in
the context of arbitrations among one-shot players like consumers and
employees on the one hand, and repeat players, like businesses and em-
ployers, on the other.77 As most readers know, businesses and employers
dramatically increased their use of pre-dispute arbitration agreements in
the 1980s and 1990s. Looking for less expensive and speedier methods for
resolving disputes, these entities turned toward arbitration. The Supreme
Court facilitated the move to arbitration by sanctioning agreements that
mandated arbitration of the vast majority of statutory claims.78 Not sur-
prisingly, some of the businesses adopting arbitral processes overreached,
attempting to bias the arbitration process heavily in their favor by, for
example, skewing the arbitrator selection process,79 choosing inconve-
nient locations for the arbitration,80 or charging disputants excessive fees
to participate in arbitration.81 Courts and policy makers intervened,
though, establishing parameters for businesses interested in using arbitra-
tion to resolve disputes with consumers and employees. In addition to
ensuring fair arbitrator selection processes, courts and policy makers cir-
75. Arbitration ground rules focus on the arbitrator’s personal preferences and the
procedural rules that will govern the arbitration hearing. Among other issues, an arbitra-
tor’s ground rules might address introduction of documentary evidence, sequestration of
witnesses, order of witness testimony, administration of witness oaths, time limitations on
opening or closing statements, and length of hearing breaks. See JOHN W. COOLEY, THE
ARBITRATOR’S HANDBOOK 79 (2d ed. 1998).
76. This generalized view of arbitration is not quite an accurate picture of the reality
of domestic arbitration practice in the United States. In fact, even in the 1980s, arbitrators
and arbitral institutions offered “a diverse range of arbitration products.” W. Mark C.
Weidemaier, Toward a Theory of Precedent in Arbitration, 51 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1895,
1905 (2010).
77. Maureen A. Weston, Reexamining Arbitral Immunity in an Age of Mandatory and
Professional Arbitration, 88 MINN. L. REV. 449, 459 (acknowledging that arbitration has
changed from the voluntary model to a “commercialized industry that is imposed upon
consumers and employees”).
78. Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 35 (1991) (acknowledging
that an ADEA claim may be arbitrated).
79. Hooters of Am., Inc. v. Phillips, 173 F.3d 933, 938–39 (4th Cir. 1999).
80. Brower v. Gateway 2000, Inc., 676 N.Y.S.2d 569, 574–75 (N.Y. App. Div. 1998)
(arbitration hearing location in Paris at the ICC Chamber of Commerce is both inconve-
nient and expensive and, therefore, unconscionable).
81. Id. at 571, 575 ($4,000 filing fee is excessive and therefore unconscionable); Myers
v. Terminix Int’l Co., 697 N.E.2d 277, 280–81 (Ohio Ct. Com. Pl. 1998) (arbitration provi-
sion in service contract unenforceable because it would require payment of a $2,000 filing
fee on a small claim).
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cumscribed businesses’ ability to require consumers and employees to
pay administrative and arbitrator fees, curtail discovery, and bind only
consumers and employees to arbitration, rather than both parties.82 In
addition, policy makers developed a “due process protocol” that one of
the two major arbitrator providers ultimately adopted,83 ensuring that ar-
bitrators will be qualified in the subject matter over which they preside,
be able to award whatever relief would be available to disputants in
court, be impartial, reveal conflicts of interest, and be trained in the law,
including procedural and remedial issues that might arise, relevant to
those cases over which the arbitrator would preside.84 Both major arbi-
tration service providers authorize a party to request that the arbitrator
hold a management conference prior to an arbitration hearing in a variety
of cases. These management conferences, which are similar to a pretrial
conference, review guidelines for discovery,85 including interrogatories
82. Hooters, 173 F.3d at 940; Morrison v. Circuit City Stores, Inc., 317 F.3d 646, 675
(6th Cir. 2003).
83. The other provider, JAMS, has its own standards. See JUDICIAL ARBITRATION
AND MEDIATION SERVS. (JAMS), JAMS POLICY ON EMPLOYMENT ARBITRATION MINI-
MUM STANDARDS OF PROCEDURAL FAIRNESS 2 (July 15, 2009), https://www.jamsadr.com/
files/Uploads/Documents/JAMS-Rules/JAMS_Employment_Min_Stds-2009.pdf [https://
perma.cc/G94L-MG5N] [hereinafter JAMS STANDARDS OF PROCEDURAL FAIRNESS]. Em-
ployers must follow this policy in order to have JAMS administer an arbitration on their
behalf. The standards are similar to the AAA’s Due Process Protocol. See AM. ARBITRA-
TION ASS’N, CONSUMER DUE PROCESS PROTOCOL STATEMENT OF PRINCIPLES 1 (1998),
https://adr.org/aaa/ShowPDF?doc=ADRSTG_005014 [https://perma.cc/YM4H-B7WZ]
[hereinafter AAA’S CONSUMER DUE PROCESS PROTOCOL]. JAMS asserts that it supports
the application of the Consumer Protocol, and that its standards are consistent with the
Protocol. For example, Standard 6 provides that the only fee an employee filing a claim in
arbitration may be required to pay is the initial JAMS Case Management Fee. See JAMS
STANDARDS OF PROCEDURAL FAIRNESS, supra at 4. After that, the employee is not respon-
sible for paying the arbitrator. Id. According to the JAMS Standards, “[t]he only fee that
an employee may be required to pay is JAMS’s initial Case Management Fee. All other
costs must be borne by the company, including any additional JAMS Case Management
Fee and all professional fees for the arbitrator’s services.” Id. JAMS’s Demand for Arbitra-
tion Form provides that for a two-party matter, the initial filing fee is $1,200. For matters
involving three or more parties, the filing fee is $2,000. See JUDICIAL ARBITRATION AND
MEDIATION SERVS., DEMAND FOR ARBITRATION FORM 1, https://www.jamsadr.com/files/
Uploads/Documents/JAMS_Arbitration_Demand.pdf [https://perma.cc/2SGN-5LB6].
84. The first arbitration due process protocol, Due Process Protocol for Mediation and
Arbitration of Statutory Disputes Arising Out of the Employment Relationship, was created
in 1995 by a task force of “individuals from diverse organizations involved in labor and
employment law.” See JOHN T. DUNLOP & ARNOLD M. ZACK, MEDIATION AND ARBITRA-
TION OF EMPLOYMENT DISPUTES, APPENDIX B, at 171–78 (1997). A study of the Consumer
Protocol showed that AAA takes seriously its promise to ensure enforcement of the proto-
col’s mandates. According to Professor Chris Drahozal and his co-author, Samantha Zy-
ontz, a review of AAA’s records revealed that AAA carefully vets business arbitration
clauses for protocol compliance and takes seriously its threat not to administer cases in
which the business fails to comply with the protocol. See Christopher R. Drahozal &
Samantha Zyontz, Private Regulation of Consumer Arbitration, 79 TENN. L. REV. 289,
289–90 (2012).
85. AAA has an “initial discovery protocol” for employment arbitration cases. See
AM. ARBITRATION ASS’N, AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION INITIAL DISCOVERY
PROTOCOLS FOR EMPLOYMENT ARBITRATION CASES 1, https://community.adr.org/servlet/
JiveServlet/previewBody/1164-102-1-1127/AAA_DiscoveryProtocols_Employment.pdf
[https://perma.cc/4353-QF2N]. This protocol requires that both claimant and respondent
produce “all communications between the parties (including other formal claims or
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and depositions, timing for filing of motions and decisions on motions,
and timing of the hearing and ultimate decision. It is common for busi-
nesses with relatively strict limits on discovery to relax those limitations
during these management conferences with the arbitrator.86
Interestingly, many businesses went well beyond the requirements of
the due process protocol in their pre-dispute arbitration agreements with
consumers and employees. Some businesses require that arbitrators be
lawyers as well as experts in the subject matter of the dispute over which
they preside.87 Many businesses reduce the fees a consumer or an em-
ployee will pay to file a demand for arbitration to a negligible amount
and pay for the arbitrator fees themselves.88 In addition, businesses typi-
charges) concerning the factual allegations or claims at issue in the arbitration;
[d]ocuments concerning the formation, terms and conditions, and termination of the em-
ployment relationship; [d]ocuments concerning any application for (and receipt of) unem-
ployment benefits and/or disability benefits.” Id. It also requires that respondent produce
“[c]laimant’s personnel file,” including “performance evaluations and formal discipline . . .
or write-ups; [d]ocuments relied on to make the employment decision(s) at issue; [r]elevant
job descriptions, compensation and benefits documents, and workplace policies or guide-
lines.” Id. at 2. It also requires a table of contents or index for any applicable employee
handbook, documents concerning the investigation of any complaints “about or made by
the claimant,” and “[i]dentification of claimant’s supervisor(s) and/or manager(s), other
individual(s) involved in making the adverse action decision or with knowledge of the facts
concerning the claims or defenses.” Id.
86. See generally Neal M. Eiseman, John E. Bulman & R. Thomas Dunn, Tale of Two
Lawyers: How Arbitrators and Advocates Can Avoid the Dangerous Convergence of Arbi-
tration and Litigation, 14 CARDOZO J. CONFLICT RESOL. 683, 686–87 (2013); Radha
Kulkarni, Optimizing the Initial Arbitration Management Conference, 38 L.A. LAW. 10
(2015). An arbitrator’s power to require document production between the parties “can
reside in: (i) the parties’ agreement; (ii) the institutional arbitration rules governing the
procedures, which either expressly authorize such discovery or place the scope of discovery
in the discretion of the arbitrator; or (iii) applicable arbitration statutes, such as the Federal
Arbitration Act (FAA).” Courts construe the FAA “to confer on arbitrators the power to
compel the parties to exchange documents prior to the hearing.” Philip D. O’Neill, The
Power of Arbitrators to Award Monetary Sanctions for Discovery Abuse, 60 DISPUTE
RESOL. J. 60, 62–63 (2005).
87. See KBR Dispute Resolution Program Plan and Rules, KBR, INC. 13 (2016), https:/
/technicalstaffingresources.com/Onboarding/Dispute-Resolution-Plan-and-Rules.pdf
[https://perma.cc/E7A5-S3JL] [hereinafter KBR Dispute Resolution Program Plan and
Rules] (arbitrator must be a licensed attorney). AAA gives its employees the option to
arbitrate employment disputes. Arbitrators must have at least ten years of employment law
experience. The Smart Solution, AM. ARBITRATION ASS’N 6 (Feb. 1, 1998), https://www.adr
.org/cs/idcplg?IdcService=GET_FILE&dDocName=ADRSTG_009801&RevisionSelec
tionMethod=LatestReleased [Perma link unavailable] [hereinafter The Smart Solution].
Uber’s arbitration agreement requires that the arbitrator be an attorney licensed to prac-
tice in the location where the arbitration proceeding will be conducted or a retired federal
or state judicial officer. U.S. Terms of Use: Arbitration Agreement, UBER 12 (Nov. 21,
2016), https://www.uber.com/legal/terms/us/ [https://perma.cc/DM7U-AQQD] [hereinafter
Uber Arbitration Agreement]. Today, most arbitrators are lawyers or retired judges. See
Charles J. Moxley Jr., Selecting the Ideal Arbitrator, 60 DISPUTE RESOL. J. 24, 27–28 (2005).
88. KBR Dispute Resolution Plan and Rules, supra note 87, at 12 (party pays $50 filing
fee). AAA employees pay a $100 filing fee to participate in arbitration and are entitled to a
one-time $1,000 reimbursement of the employee’s or former employee’s attorney’s fees for
mediation or arbitration of each matter. The Smart Solution, supra note 87, at 8–9. The
AAA employee pays no arbitrator compensation, although may elect to pay up to one-half
of the neutral’s compensation and expenses. Id. at 9. Under Uber’s arbitration agreement,
parties pay their own representatives, but the party is not required to bear any type of fee
or expense that it would not be required to bear if it had filed the action in a court of law.
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cally provide the arbitrator with significant discretion to order necessary
discovery and make evidentiary rulings during the arbitration process.89
Whether proceeding pursuant to institutional rules or their own arbi-
tration agreement, most businesses continue to confer significant discre-
tion on the arbitrators to run the hearing. Though prone to err on the side
of admitting evidence, arbitrators carefully consider hearsay, relevancy,
and duplicative testimony objections. Moreover, arbitrators routinely re-
fer to the rules of evidence as guidelines to assist them in running the
hearing. Although not held in a courtroom, arbitral hearings are quite
formal, with opening statements, direct and cross-examination, and
swearing in of witnesses, together with ruling on evidentiary objections.90
In many ways, both substantively and procedurally, modern arbitration
resembles a bench trial or a hearing before an administrative law judge.91
Arbitrators also write reasoned opinions more frequently today than they
did in the 1970s and 1980s.92 These opinions look much like judicial opin-
Uber Arbitration Agreement, supra note 87, at 16–17. Macy’s arbitration agreement states
that an employee filing a claim in arbitration will pay the cost of arbitration up to a “maxi-
mum of the least of one (1) day’s base pay or One Hundred Twenty-Five Dollars ($125),
whichever is less.” See Sellers v. Macy’s Retail Holdings, Inc., No. 2:12-CV-02496-SHL,
2014 WL 2826119, at *3 (W.D Tenn. June 15, 2014). Macy’s plan also authorizes Macy’s to
reimburse an employee for legal consultation and representation during the arbitration
process up to $2,500 during a rolling twelve-month period. Id. Under AAA Employment
Arbitration Rules and Mediation Procedures, for disputes arising under employer promul-
gated plans, “[t]he employer shall pay the arbitrator’s compensation unless the employee,
post dispute, voluntarily elects to pay a portion of the arbitrator’s compensation.” AM.
ARBITRATION ASS’N, EMPLOYMENT ARBITRATION RULES AND MEDIATION PROCEDURES
33 (Nov. 1, 2009), https://www.adr.org/sites/default/files/Employment%20Rules.pdf [https:/
/perma.cc/CG8T-VMPP] [hereinafter AAA’S EMPLOYMENT ARBITRATION RULES]. Em-
ployees pay a $200 non-refundable filing fee. The employer pays the arbitrator’s expenses
as well. Id. at 33, 35.
89. KBR Dispute Resolution Plan and Rules, supra note 87, at 15–17; The Smart Solu-
tion, supra note 87, at 7 (arbitrator has authority to order discovery); Uber Arbitration
Agreement, supra note 87, at 14 (arbitrator has authority to order discovery).
90. See, e.g., AAA’S EMPLOYMENT ARBITRATION RULES, supra note 88, at 25 (“Wit-
nesses for each party shall submit to direct and cross examination.”).
91. See, e.g., Gary McGowan, Don’t Call It a “Trial”: What Litigators Should Know
About Arbitration, 52 THE HOUS. LAW. 12, 14 (July/Aug. 2014). Although often conducted
in a hotel or office, an arbitration hearing “resembles a bench trial: opening statements,
claimant’s evidence, respondent’s evidence, rebuttal evidence and closing arguments” are
all given. Id. “Witnesses are sworn and give direct testimony subject to cross-examination.”
Id. “If either party wishes, the hearing will be transcribed.” Id. However, unlike a bench
trial, the “rules of evidence do not strictly apply (unless the parties agree otherwise). Gen-
erally, arbitrators view extensive use of objections as obstructive and/or time wasting.
Moreover, they are reluctant to exclude evidence for fear of vacatur,” as “‘refusing to hear
evidence pertinent and material to the controversy’” is one of the few grounds for vacating
an award. Id. (citing 9 U.S.C. § 10 (2012)). A more relaxed approach to evidence is there-
fore deployed in arbitration hearings than would be seen during a bench trial or adminis-
trative hearing. “[A]ll documents are usually deemed admitted at the outset, unless there
are serious questions about authenticity.” McGowan, supra at 14. Hearsay rules are often
relaxed, “[m]otions to strike experts will likely be denied,” and “affidavits may be allowed
[without] cross-examination.” Id. However, some objections may find traction if the evi-
dence is cumulative or redundant; completely irrelevant or not probative; contains too
much hearsay or double hearsay; or if an attorney extensively asks leading questions to a
friendly witness during direct on disputed subjects. See id.
92. KBR Rules require that the award be in writing and shall be a reasoned award that
includes “a brief statement of the essential findings of fact and conclusions of law on which
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ions. Moreover, arbitrators deciding legal issues often seek out “prece-
dent,” like court decisions or other arbitral opinions, to help guide their
decision-making. Like judges, law-trained arbitrators prefer to decide
cases consistent with the law and with other arbitrators’ decisions.93
Prompted by judicial decision-making and policy reform, businesses
and employers offer an arbitration procedure that is relatively inexpen-
sive to the consumer or employee while providing reasonable discovery
and an opportunity to file dispositive motions and respond to motions
filed. Moreover, this reformed arbitration process enables consumers or
employees to participate in a hearing that largely mirrors a trial (albeit
with more limited application of evidentiary rules), and receive a final
decision with findings of fact and conclusions of law.
The more formal arbitration process many repeat players use when im-
plementing arbitration agreements with one-shot players may come close
to satisfying the objections Delgado levied, and might still levy, against
arbitration. Delgado does not rank by importance the various formalities
available to minority disputants through the traditional litigation process.
Thus, it is hard to predict whether Delgado, and other critics of dispute
resolution, would approve of this new, more formal, arbitral process.
But, clearly, some of the major tenets essential to a formal process that
Delgado identified in his 1985 article are now apparent in modern arbi-
tration. Arbitrators typically apply relevant legal rules in their analysis of
disputes, and arbitrators are experts in the field in which they arbitrate.
Thus, their caseload is repetitive, which enables them, like judges, to
avoid biases in a particular case. Precedent still does not bind arbitrators,
but, unquestionably, arbitrators look to other arbitral decisions, as well as
court decisions, to help guide their decision-making. Parties also present
evidence in the same competitive fashion as do parties in litigation. In
addition, although not enforceable by law, arbitrators must comply with
codes of arbitral conduct which, in many states, fundamentally mirror the
the award is based.” KBR Dispute Resolution Plan and Rules, supra note 87, at 20. Uber’s
arbitration agreement states that the “[t]he Arbitrator will issue a decision or award in
writing, stating the essential findings of fact and conclusions of law.” Uber Arbitration
Agreement, supra note 87. The Uber agreement also precludes the arbitrator from commit-
ting errors of law or legal reasoning, and states that the award may be vacated or corrected
on appeal to a court of competent jurisdiction for any such error. Id. Macy’s requires that if
the employee’s claim “arises under federal or state statutory law, the award should include
findings of fact and conclusions of law.” SOLUTIONS INSTORE at 14 (on file with author).
93. After examining arbitrators’ citation practices in securities, labor, employment,
and class action arbitration, Professor Mark C. Weidemaier found that arbitrators, particu-
larly in employment and class action arbitration cases, “routinely” wrote lengthy, reasoned
awards, spending considerable time analyzing the extant legal issues and extensively using
precedent. Mark C. Weidemaier, Judging-Lite: How Arbitrators Use and Create Precedent,
90 N.C. L. REV. 1091, 1139 (2012) (outside of securities disputes, “arbitrators wrote reason-
ably lengthy decisions that were substantially devoted to legal analysis and that made am-
ple use of precedent.”). In addition, Professor Weidemaier found that, outside of labor
arbitration, the “overwhelming majority” of awards cite judicial precedent. Id. at 1140. He
found the similarity between arbitrators’ opinions and judicial opinions “striking.” Id.
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Code of Judicial Conduct that binds judges.94 Rules of evidence and pro-
cedure remain more relaxed in arbitration. But, procedural rules in par-
ticular have begun to play a larger role in the arbitral process. Many of
the procedural rule benefits Delgado cites—notice, timely filing of plead-
ings, attorney’s signature on pleadings—exist in arbitration. Thus, as in
the courtroom, these rules may reduce the likelihood that arbitration
could become a breeding ground for prejudice and bias. Finally, because
their livelihood is on the line, and the arbitral providers insist on compli-
ance with arbitrator codes of ethics, it seems unlikely that many arbitra-
tors would ignore applicable ethical rules.
94. For example, in some New York jurisdictions using small claims arbitrators, liti-
gants must elect between trial by a judge or by an arbitrator. See Gerald Lebovits, Small
Claims Courts Offer Prompt Adjudication Based on Substantive Law, 70 N.Y. ST. B. J. 6,
14–15 (1998). When arbitrating, the “experienced, qualified and carefully selected attor-
neys” are required to comply with the Code of Judicial Conduct and the Rules Governing
Judicial Conduct. Id. However, arbitrators are not held to the ethical standards required of
Article III federal judges, as articulated in 28 U.S.C. § 455 (2012) (governing the disqualifi-
cation of a justice, judge, or magistrate judge). “Standards for disqualification in the AAA
Commercial Arbitration Rules and the Code of Ethics for Arbitrators are not so stringent
as those in the federal statutes on judges or in Canons 2 and 3(C) of the Code of Judicial
Conduct for United States Judges and the ABA’s Code of Judicial Conduct.” MARTIN
DOMKE, GABRIEL WILNER & LARRY E. EDMONSON, 1 DOMKE ON COMMERCIAL ARBI-
TRATION § 5:4 (2016) (citing 28 U.S.C.A. § 455); AM. BAR ASS’N, ABA MODEL CODE OF
JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canons 2, 3, subd. C. In his concurrence in Commonwealth Coatings
Corp. v. Cont’l Casualty Co., Justice White wrote:
The Court does not decide today that arbitrators are to be held to the stan-
dards of judicial decorum of Article III judges, or indeed of any judges. It is
often because they are men of affairs, not apart from but of the marketplace,
that they are effective in their adjudicatory function. This does not mean the
judiciary must overlook outright chicanery in giving effect to their awards;
that would be an abdication of our responsibility. But it does mean that arbi-
trators are not automatically disqualified by a business relationship with the
parties before them if both parties are informed of the relationship in ad-
vance, or if they are unaware of the facts but the relationship is trivial. I see
no reason automatically to disqualify the best informed and most capable
potential arbitrators.
393 U.S. 145, 150 (1968) (White, J. concurring) (citations omitted). “Since Justice White’s
vote was essential to a majority, his statement as to what the court was not deciding has
been treated as authoritative.” DOMKE, supra at § 5:4 (citing Merit Ins. Co. v. Leatherby
Ins. Co., 714 F.2d 673, 682 (7th Cir. 1983)); see also David Allen Larson, Conflicts of Inter-
est and Disclosures: Are We Making a Mountain Out of a Molehill?, 49 S. TEX. L. REV. 879,
879, 906 (2008) (arguing that “[e]xpress incorporation of judicial standards may create ad-
ditional obligations for arbitrators” and examining the “numerous and varied” ethical stan-
dards governing conflicts of interest disclosure requirements for arbitrators, including the
Federal Arbitration Act (FAA); Revised Uniform Arbitration Act (RUAA); AAA/ABA
Code of Ethics for Arbitrators in Commercial Disputes; and the National Arbitration Fo-
rum (NAF) Code of Conduct for Arbitrators). Professor Larson argues that “[j]udicial
conduct codes expressly incorporated into an arbitral association’s code of conduct may
require disclosure and even disqualification in circumstances that would not be problem-
atic under the arbitral code.” Larson, supra at 907. “[W]hile professional associations are
historically more active and prolific in generating standards, recent activities in the states
(like California, Florida, and Minnesota) suggest that formal ethical rules or standards of
conduct, analogized to Judicial Codes of Conduct, will come from legislatures and courts
acting in their regulatory capacity.” Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Ethics Issues in Arbitration
and Related Dispute Resolution Processes: What’s Happening and What’s Not, 56 U. MIAMI
L. REV. 949, 981 (2002).
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But objections may remain. Traditional litigation, at least in federal
court, offers decision makers who are appointed to lengthy terms and,
thus, do not have to be politically responsive. Litigation provides more
stringent rules of procedure and evidence, as well as the application of
the principle of stare decisis and appellate review. In addition, court-
rooms are open to the public (arbitral hearings are typically confidential),
and the judge’s robe and other formalities do not exist in arbitration.
The question is whether the increased formality of the arbitral process,
achieved over the last thirty years of reform, is sufficient to create an
environment in which a minority disputant would have both faith in the
integrity of the arbitration process and, in fact, receive the justice all dis-
putants deserve from an adjudicative process. With some additional effort
to ensure the integrity of the arbitral process, I believe the arbitral pro-
cess provides the kind of access to justice, together with a fair process,
that might well serve both minority disputants and one-shot players
alike.95
Multiple alterations to the arbitration process could bring arbitration
even closer to the formal process Delgado envisioned as necessary to re-
duce biased behavior by disputants and neutrals. Changes to arbitration
confidentiality, greater application of procedural and evidentiary rules,96
more expansive discovery,97 elimination of blanket immunity for arbitra-
95. As Deborah Hensler noted in 1990, arbitration may provide greater due process
than other settlement mechanisms and may, as a practical matter, be many litigants’ only
option because the litigation process is so slow and expensive. Deborah R. Hensler, Court-
Ordered Arbitration: An Alternative View, 1990 UNIV. OF CHICAGO LEGAL FORUM 399,
399, 419 (1990), http://chicagounbound.uchicago.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1074&con
text=uclf [https://perma.cc/XR3V-LVT6].
96. Professor Stephen J. Ware noted that the procedures of bankruptcy litigation are
very similar to those of arbitration. Stephen J. Ware, Similarities Between Arbitration and
Bankruptcy Litigation, 11 NEV. L.J. 436, 436 (2011). For instance, like in arbitration,
“[h]earings on contested matters in bankruptcy [litigation] tend to be faster and less elabo-
rate than trials in ordinary civil litigation.” Id. at 444. “Although the Federal Rules of
Evidence apply to bankruptcy cases, ‘most practitioners probably would agree that they
are not strictly enforced because almost all matters are tried by the bankruptcy judge[,]’ as
opposed to a jury.” Id. In arbitration, “most parties use ‘off-the-rack’ rules previously writ-
ten by an arbitration organization like the American Arbitration Association (AAA).” Id.
at 447. “In arbitration, as in bankruptcy contested matters, evidence is often introduced by
affidavit or declaration, rather than oral presentation in open court.” Id. at 450. Likewise,
as in bankruptcy proceedings, the rules of evidence tend not to be strictly enforced in
arbitration hearings, as arbitrators, like a bankruptcy judge or presiding bench trial judge,
are generally better suited for evaluating the probative value of evidence than a jury would
be. See id. at 450–52.
97. “Unlike litigation under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, discovery in arbitra-
tion can be very limited.” W. Scott Simpson & Omer Kesikli, The Contours of Arbitration
Discovery, 67 ALA. LAW. 280, 280 (2006). “Discovery devices such as interrogatories, re-
quests for admissions and mental examinations are generally not employed in arbitration.”
Id. “Depositions of parties are common in arbitration, but depositions of nonparties are
rare.” On the other hand, in litigation, depositions of nonparties are extremely common.
Id. “These discovery devices, although usually helpful in developing a case, can be very
expensive.” Id. (citing John C. Koski, From Hide-And-Seek to Show-And-Tell: Evidentiary
Disclosure Rules, 17 AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC. 497 (1993) (noting that attorney’s fees gener-
ated from discovery account for forty to sixty percent (40%–60%) of a law firm’s profits);
see also J.S. “Chris” Christie, Jr., Preparing for and Prevailing at an Arbitration Hearing, 32
AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC. 265, 266 (2008) (“The time required for an arbitration hearing is
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tors,98 expanded opinion writing, greater scrutiny of arbitrators,99 diver-
sity among the arbitrator corps, and broader judicial review,100 especially
when the disputants are one-shot players facing repeat players, are
among the potential improvements possible.
In this article, however, I focus on only two possible changes to arbitra-
tion: mandating reasoned opinion writing and increasing diversity among
the arbitrator corps. I am selecting these two ideas because they could be
implemented quickly and at a relatively low cost. These changes would
not require outside intervention—simply cooperation from the prospec-
tive parties, their lawyers, and the institutions providing arbitral services.
I recommend the adoption of a reasoned opinion writing requirement
because it is already a virtual norm within arbitration101 at this point.
Despite adoption of this norm by institutional providers, the message
generally less than for a trial in a court, especially a jury trial. As a consequence, arbitra-
tion litigation expenses are usually lower than court litigation expenses and arbitrations are
usually completed more quickly than trials.”); David S. Schwartz, Mandatory Arbitration
and Fairness, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1247, 1268 (2009) (“[L]imits on discovery (and to a
lesser extent on pretrial motion practice) hold down the actual costs of arbitration relative
to litigation.”).
98. Maureen A. Weston, Reexamining Arbitral Immunity in an Age of Mandatory and
Professional Arbitration, 88 MINN. L. REV. 449, 515 (2004) (recommending adoption of
qualified immunity for arbitrators in part because the expanded use of consumer arbitra-
tion, where companies mandate arbitration as a condition of doing business, undermines
the legitimacy of the arbitration process in the eyes of the public). Weston also suggests
consideration of other possible changes, including requiring arbitrators to obtain certifica-
tion or licensure. Id. at 512–13.
99. Deborah Hensler suggests that one way to guard against decisions that disadvan-
tage women and minorities is to periodically publish lists of current arbitrators for public
scrutiny. “To guard against awards that systematically disadvantage plaintiffs or defend-
ants,” Hensler recommended that courts be “instructed to publish statistical data on the
distribution of arbitration awards on a regular basis.” Hensler, supra note 95, at 419–20.
100. I am choosing not to focus on judicial review for two reasons. First, there is no
question that enhanced judicial review would slow the arbitration process dramatically.
Worse yet, the Supreme Court has struck down party demands for increased judicial re-
view. See Hall St. Assocs., LLC v. Mattel, Inc. 552 U.S. 576, 585–86 (2008).
101. Labor and employment arbitration rules require writing a reasoned opinion and
subsequent publication. See AAA’S EMPLOYMENT ARBITRATION RULES, supra note 88, at
29 (“The award shall be in writing and shall be signed by a majority of the arbitrators and
shall provide the written reasons for the award unless the parties agree otherwise. It shall
be executed in the manner required by law.”); JUDICIAL ARBITRATION AND MEDIATION
SERVS., JAMS EMPLOYMENT ARBITRATION RULES & PROCEDURES 22–23 (July 1, 2014),
https://www.jamsadr.com/files/Uploads/Documents/JAMS-Rules/
JAMS_employment_arbitration_rules-2014.pdf [https://perma.cc/2HY8-F82A] (“The
Award shall consist of a written statement signed by the Arbitrator regarding the disposi-
tion of each claim and the relief, if any, as to each claim. The Award shall also contain a
concise written statement of the reasons for the Award, stating the essential findings and
conclusions on which the Award is based. The Parties may agree to any other form of
Award, unless the Arbitration is based on an arbitration agreement that is required as a
condition of employment.”). AM. ARBITRATION ASS’N, CONSUMER ARBITRATION RULES
27, (Sept. 1, 2014), https://www.adr.org/sites/default/files/Consumer%20Rules.pdf [https://
perma.cc/LWT6-DSPF] [hereinafter AAA CONSUMER ARBITRATION RULES] (Rule 43(a):
“Any award shall be in writing and executed in the form and manner required by law;”
Rule 43(b): “The award shall provide the concise written reasons for the decision unless
the parties all agree otherwise. Any disagreements over the form of the award shall be
decided by the arbitrator.”); see also infra notes 146–148 and accompanying text (discuss-
ing increased availability and enhancements of written FINRA arbitration awards).
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about the availability of these opinions is not well-known to the general
public. Reasoned opinion writing, and subsequent publication of these
opinions, is also a cheap fix to many perceived problems with arbitration.
As discussed more fully below, because I believe it would be relatively
easy to implement at low cost, it should be mandated in all institutional
rules so that disputants, the public, and arbitration critics understand
what is actually happening in arbitration. Accompanying the mandate of
reasoned opinion writing with publication of decisions (already happen-
ing in AAA employment and labor arbitration decisions) would enhance
the benefits of this requirement for minority and one-shot players, as
more fully articulated below.
Less easy to achieve, but also providing considerable benefit to the
one-shot or minority disputant, would be diversification of the arbitrator
corps. I focus on this issue because I believe it has been largely over-
looked by arbitration’s critics and because few have offered concrete sug-
gestions for change. I hope to offer such suggestions and identify ways in
which the parties, their attorneys, and the institutions providing arbitral
services can work together to make the arbitral forum both substantively
and procedurally attractive to all disputants. Diversification would also
provide assurance to litigants that potential arbitrators are not monolithic
in their views about discrimination or other issues that typically arise in
arbitration.
III. ARBITRATION OPINION WRITING: FORMALIZING
ARBITRATION AT A (RELATIVELY) LOW COST
Although arbitration is undoubtedly more formal today than it was at
any time in the past, additional procedural protections may be critical to
ensuring an adequate forum for resolution of disputes involving minority
parties and one-shot players. This section advocates enhancing the for-
mality of the arbitral process by adopting a reasoned opinion and publica-
tion requirement in disputes involving one-shot and repeat players.
Requiring arbitrators to write and publish reasoned opinions could pro-
vide the kind of protection traditional litigation presumably provides mi-
nority disputants for a relatively low cost and without some of the risks
Delgado feared. An opinion writing and publication requirement in dis-
putes involving one-shot and repeat players, included in provider organi-
zations’ due process protocols and/or rules, could create the structure
necessary to reduce decision-maker prejudice, improve the quality of de-
cision-making, enable more careful selection of unbiased arbitrators, and
allow for greater adherence to earlier arbitral precedent, which also
reduces bias in decision-making. Opinions may also provide a greater
sense of resolution to the parties, who will now have a deeper under-
standing of the reasons they won or lost. Moreover, both the reasoned
opinion and publication requirements might improve both the parties and
the public’s perception of arbitration as a fair and legitimate forum for
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the resolution of disputes, which is particularly important to arbitration’s
critics, like Delgado.
As discussed earlier, arbitration is much closer to litigation in terms of
providing structured decision-making than critics have suggested. If rea-
soned written and published opinions were required, the arbitral process
might provide exactly the formal avenue for resolution that ensures pro-
tection of the rights of minority and other one-shot disputants. As it turns
out, arbitrators engage in decision-making and opinion-writing processes
(when they write opinions) that is remarkably similar to the process in
which judges engage. Moreover, recent studies confirm long-held beliefs
in the arbitral community that arbitrators are capable of understanding
and applying precedent and can interpret legal rulings in a manner similar
to judges.102 If these studies are accurate, greater transparency in all types
of arbitration, through the implementation of mandatory arbitrator opin-
ion writing, could substantially improve the process itself as well as the
public’s and parties’ perceptions of the process.
A. PUBLISHED REASONED WRITTEN OPINIONS WILL BENEFIT
THE ONE-SHOT PLAYER
Judicial opinion writing serves three purposes. First, opinion writing
improves judges’ decision-making process by prompting them to consider
critically and carefully the facts and law at issue in a particular decision.
Second, the process, when opinions are published, generates precedent,
so that future readers better understand what the rules of law are. Finally,
opinion writing enhances the legitimacy of the decision in the eyes of
both the parties and the public.
Arbitrators write opinions for similar reasons. In arbitration, as in liti-
gation, opinion writing encourages the arbitrator to consider carefully her
decision, ensuring that she has understood all the facts and arguments.
Published arbitral opinions also legitimize the decision in the eyes of the
parties and the public.103 At the same time, an arbitral opinion writing
102. See Susan D. Franck, Anne van Aaken, James Freda, Chris Guthrie & Jeffrey J.
Rachlinski, Inside the Arbitrator’s Mind, 66 EMORY L.J. 1115, 1137 (2017) [hereinafter In-
side the Arbitrator’s Mind]. Although the authors focus on international arbitration in this
article, their findings would likely be duplicated in domestic arbitration. Through their
research, the authors “found evidence that arbitrators, like judges, tended to make intui-
tive decisions and were influenced by well-known cognitive illusions like anchoring, fram-
ing, and the like.” Id. “Where comparisons with judges were possible, [the authors] were
generally unable to reliably distinguish between the responses of arbitrators and judges,
suggesting the two groups performed comparably.” Id. The authors “also found evidence
that arbitrators, as a group, were unlikely to merely ‘split the baby’ between claimants and
respondents.” Id. The authors concluded that their “findings cast doubt on the bona fides
of the normative narrative that international arbitrators should be stripped of jurisdiction
and replaced by judges due to cognitive predisposition.” Id.
103. “A well-reasoned opinion can contribute greatly to the acceptance of the award by
the parties by persuading them that the arbitrator understands the case and that his award
is basically sound.” FRANK ELKOURI & EDNA ASPER ELKOURI, HOW ARBITRATION
WORKS 237 (3d ed. 1977). The Supreme Court offered support for this view: “Arbitrators
have no obligation to the court to give their reasons for an award. . . . [A] well-reasoned
opinion tends to engender confidence in the integrity of the process and aids in clarifying
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requirement assists parties in arbitrator selection. Written, published ar-
bitral opinions help parties in the selection process because an arbitra-
tor’s past opinions provide prospective parties with better information
about a particular arbitrator’s decision-making process and potential bi-
ases.104 The following sections will attempt to define a reasoned written
opinion as well as the potential benefits of requiring arbitrators to both
write and publish their opinions.105
1. Reasoned Written Opinions
Like the term “arbitration,” which is not defined in the Federal Arbi-
tration Act, a “reasoned written opinion” may be somewhat in the eye of
the beholder. Yet both commentators and practitioners generally agree
on what constitutes a reasoned written opinion.106 According to the aca-
demic literature, to be reasoned, an opinion should contain the following
elements:  First, the arbitrator should identify the issues in dispute. In
doing so, the arbitrator should include relevant facts as well as the rules,
customs, or legal principles the arbitrator intends to apply to the facts.107
The goal underlying this requirement is that the parties reviewing the
opinion will realize that the arbitrator understood the evidence presented
at the hearing and was aware of the customs, rules, and laws applicable to
this type of dispute. Second, the arbitrator should use the parties’ post-
hearing briefs and/or closing arguments, together with the evidence
presented at the hearing, to identify and articulate the parties’ conten-
tions.108 This section of the opinion, common in labor arbitration opin-
the underlying agreement.” United Steelworkers of Am. v. Enter. Wheel & Car Corp., 363
U.S. 593, 598 (1960); see also Stephen L. Hayford, A New Paradigm for Commercial Arbi-
tration: Rethinking the Relationship Between Reasoned Awards and the Judicial Standards
for Vacatur, 66 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 443, 447 (1998) (maintaining that, in the long run,
commercial arbitration cannot continue without reasoned opinions that provide trans-
parency and the ability to assess the competency of arbitrators); Llewellyn Joseph Gibbons,
Private Law, Public “Justice”: Another Look at Privacy, Arbitration, and Global E-Com-
merce, 15 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 769, 773 (2000) (well-reasoned opinions help to
combat the ability of institutional repeat players to “arbitrator-shop” at the expense of a
one-time consumer grievant); see generally, Roger I. Abrams, Frances E. Abrams & Den-
nis R. Nolan, Arbitral Therapy, 46 RUTGERS L. REV. 1751 (1994) (noting that, while losing
parties may not agree with the decision, a reasoned opinion makes sure they understand
the arbitrator considered their argument).
104. Elkouri emphasized that opinions may also serve an educational function because
the arbitrator’s opinion helps guide their future actions. ELKOURI & ELKORUI, supra note
103, at 268–69.
105. While more could be done to segregate the different types of decisions arbitrators
can make into categories and mandate opinion writing only when absolutely necessary, this
article focuses more generally on benefits and drawbacks of mandating opinion writing.
See, e.g., Chad M. Oldfather, Writing, Cognition, and the Nature of the Judicial Function, 96
GEO. L. J. 1283, 1317 (2008). Other issues, such as how often and when an arbitrator
should write an opinion, might be left for another day.
106. Many institutional rules require that awards be reasoned but offer no guidance
regarding the requirement. S.I. Strong, The Reasons Behind Reasoned Arbitration Awards,
34 ALTERNATIVES TO THE HIGH COST OF LIT. 81, 81 (2016).
107. Roger I. Abrams, The Nature of the Arbitral Process: Substantive Decision-Making
in Labor Arbitration, 14 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 551, 586 (1991).
108. Id.
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ions, demonstrates that the arbitrator listened to the parties and
understood their arguments. Next, the arbitrator must include a deci-
sion.109 In this part of the opinion, the arbitrator clarifies the scope of the
decision, interprets the evidence, resolves questions of fact, applies prin-
ciples of law and custom, and explains why she accepted or rejected the
parties’ theories.110 A final section articulates what the award is and what
the consequences of that award are for each party.111
2. How the Published Reasoned Written Opinion Benefits the One-Shot
Player and/or Minority Disputant
A published reasoned written opinion would improve the arbitration
process, particularly in cases involving parties with unequal bargaining
power. A published reasoned written opinion provides valuable informa-
tion about an arbitrator’s deliberations, her understanding of the facts,
the rules or laws to be applied, and anything else that led her to her ulti-
mate decision. The opinion offers valuable insight that may aid future
disputants, as well as the parties to the dispute, in future arbitrator selec-
tion.112 In addition, the published reasoned written opinion legitimizes
the process by providing greater decision-making transparency to the par-
ties, particularly the party with less bargaining power.113 Published opin-
109. Id.
110. In judicial opinions, providing reasons enables subsequent courts to follow prece-
dent. Strong, supra note 106, at 85. While this is not a justification in the arbitral forum for
a reasoned award, both in the international setting and, now, as domestic arbitration in-
cludes the interpretation of law, in the domestic setting, “[a]rbitral awards . . . are consid-
ered important forms of persuasive authority and have been said to reflect a type of ‘soft
precedent’ in certain types of . . . matters (most notably those involving arbitral proce-
dure . . . ).” Id. at 86.
111. Abrams, supra note 107, at 587. Professor Strong cites various iterations contained
in state statutes. For example, she cites a Pennsylvania statute that defines “a reasoned
ruling as one that includes ‘findings of fact and conclusions of law based upon the evidence
as a whole . . . [and that] clearly and concisely states and explains the rationale for the
decisions so that all can determine why and how a particular result was reached.’” Strong,
supra note 106, at 84 (citing 77 PA. STAT. ANN. § 834 (West 2013)).
112. Professors Barbara Black and Jill Gross cited this reason, among others, as an
appropriate justification for the introduction of explained decisions in securities arbitra-
tion. See Letter from Barbara Black, Professor and Director of Corporate Law Center,
University of Cincinnati College of Law & Jill I. Gross, Professor and Director of Pace
Investor Rights Clinic, Pace University School of Law, to Florence Harmon, Acting Secre-
tary, Securities and Exchange Commission (2008), http://www.sec.gov/comments/sr-finra-
2008-051/finra2008051-1.pdf [https://perma.cc/3QDQ-3CDJ]. The professors stated, “be-
cause explained awards will provide parties with some insight into how arbitrators resolve
controversies, they may provide valuable information for parties to use when ranking and
striking arbitrators during arbitrator selection in future cases.” Id. at 3. The website Arbi-
trator Intelligence (arbitratorintelligence.org) is collecting published and unpublished in-
ternational arbitration awards with the goal of providing helpful information about
arbitrators’ past decision-making. See ARBITRATOR INTELLIGENCE, http://www.arbi-
tratorintelligence.org [https://perma.cc/FTL6-NW7K]. Arbitrator Intelligence’s mission is
“to promote transparency, accountability, and diversity in arbitrator appointments.” Id.
113. Professors Black and Gross also identified the need for transparency in decision-
making as a justification for the implementation of an explained decision requirement.
Interestingly, the arbitration parties themselves, the customers, also stated that they would
be more satisfied with securities arbitration outcomes if they had an explanation of the
award. See JILL I. GROSS & BARBARA BLACK, PERCEPTIONS OF FAIRNESS OF SECURITIES
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ion writing assists parties in developing confidence in arbitrators’ abilities
and helps them weed out incompetent or biased arbitrators. Moreover, a
reasoned written opinion requirement encourages the arbitrator to in-
crease her deliberation, thus, hopefully, improving the quality of the deci-
sion.114 Writing the decision helps the arbitrator think through issues,
avoid arbitrary decisions, and offer more fulsome explanations than an
oral or limited written decision would.
B. IMPROVING THE ARBITRATOR SELECTION PROCESS
One-shot players, typically perceived to be at a disadvantage in the ar-
bitrator selection process, often resist arbitration because they suspect ar-
bitrators will be biased in favor of the repeat player. This concern may be
aggravated for minority disputants, who might be especially skeptical of
the typical arbitrator panel, made up primarily of white men over the age
of fifty. The introduction of reasoned written opinions to the arbitration
process might allay parties’ concerns about biased arbitrators or, alterna-
tively, validate the concerns.115 In the latter situation, a published rea-
soned opinion would help future parties avoid selecting a biased or
prejudiced decision maker.116
Moreover, and, perhaps, more importantly, the greater understanding
parties develop about arbitrator bias through the published reasoned
written opinion aids future parties even more in arbitration than it would
in litigation. After all, parties can choose their decision maker in arbitra-
ARBITRATION: AN EMPIRICAL STUDY 39 (Feb. 6, 2008) (Fifty-five percent (55%) of cus-
tomers stated that they would be more satisfied with the outcome of their arbitration had
they received an explanation of the award).
114. Most scholars focus on judges, rather than arbitrators, when discussing the benefits
of deliberation. The principles underlying decision-making, though, would be unlikely to
change whether the decision maker was an arbitrator or a judge. One author explained
that in the process of writing an opinion, a judge must “clarify his thoughts as he reduces
them to paper.” Mary Kate Kearney, The Propriety of Poetry in Judicial Opinions, 12 WID-
ENER L.J. 597, 599 (2003). It is through the “process of reducing one’s ideas to writing” that
enables a decision maker to assess whether or not his reasoning is sound. Id. A judge,
advising law clerks, stated that “[j]udges write opinions for many reasons: to help think
through the issues; to explain to the parties, their counsel, and the appellate courts how
and why the case was decided; to advance the law’s development; to provide consistency by
setting precedent; . . . and to convince a possibly unfavorable audience that the judge wrote
a correct decision.” Gerald Lebovits & Lucero Ramirez Hidalgo, Advice to Law Clerks:
How to Draft Your First Judicial Opinion, 36 WESTCHESTER BAR J. 29, 29 (2009).
115. Professor Mark Weidemaier suggests that parties might even be willing to “pay for
reasoned awards because they believe that arbitrators who must provide a written explana-
tion are less likely to make careless or biased decisions.” W. Mark C. Weidemaier, Toward
a Theory of Precedent in Arbitration, 51 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1895, 1919–20 (2010).
116. In labor arbitration, parties have considerable information, both from their own
experience as well as from written decisions, about prospective arbitrators. As Chris
Honeyman noted, the reasoned opinion in labor arbitration helps arbitrator selection be-
cause an arbitrator must explain her decision and “that this may affect future similar cases;
thus whether or not a given arbitrator has a tendency to state things in too broad terms is a
criterion they will take into account.” Christopher Honeyman, How to Find an Arbitrator,
CR INFO, http://www.beyondintractability.org/coreknowledge/howto-find-arbitrator
[https://perma.cc/SSR3-4LRY] (last updated Apr. 2013).
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tion but are not afforded the same opportunity in litigation.117 The pub-
lished reasoned written opinion requirement would also help arbitrators
who, like judges, are likely to be more consistent in their decision-making
if they have a record of their decisions and deliberate before writing that
decision. Arbitrators who decide a particular case one way on one occa-
sion are likely to decide a similar case the same way on another day. Most
arbitrators want to be consistent in the way they adjudicate disputes—not
only does the writing of opinions reveal the way they make decisions, but
it also aids them in future decisions by reminding them of the way they
approached a particular problem in the past. Finally, arbitrators benefit
from reading other arbitrators’ opinions. Although not bound by prece-
dent, arbitrators seek guidance from other arbitrators as to how an issue
should be resolved.118
In addition, published reasoned written opinions provide useful infor-
mation to parties and the market about the process of arbitration, to-
gether with information about an arbitrator’s abilities. As Professor
Weidemaier observed:
Reasoned awards can communicate that the arbitrator possesses . . .
[the] qualities [of diligence, expertise, and impartiality] and therefore
enhance the arbitrator’s legitimacy to future purchasers of arbitra-
tion services. Thus, a central feature of reasoned awards is that they
serve to legitimize both the arbitrator (in general) and the arbitra-
tion (in particular) in the eyes of a number of important constituen-
cies: the disputants themselves, external actors who may play a role
in enforcing the award, and future purchasers of the arbitrator’s
services.119
Of course, at least some of this depends on whether the arbitrator’s
opinion is published. In labor arbitration, reasoned written opinions are
routinely published.120 Perhaps less well known is that since year 2000,
117. In other words, biased judges might remain on the bench indefinitely, if appointed
for life. A biased arbitrator, on the other hand, assuming her opinions are published and
accessible, would be unlikely to be hired again.
118. This predisposition of arbitrators may come from their background in law. Most
arbitrators today are lawyers. The popularity of the Elkouris’ HOW ARBITRATION WORKS,
ELKOURI & ELKOURI, supra note 103, considered the “bible” of labor arbitration, might
also be explained by the predisposition of decision makers to decide cases similar to other
decision makers faced with a similar set of facts, rules, and law.
119. Weidemaier, supra note 115, at 1919. Professor Stephen Hayford agreed: “in most
cases . . . the only indicia of . . . arbitrator competencies are the manner in which the
neutral conducts the hearing and the perceived correctness of the result reached.” Stephen
Hayford & Ralph Peeples, Commercial Arbitration in Evolution: An Assessment and Call
for Dialogue, 10 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 343, 403 (1995). See also Gibbons, supra note
103, at 772–73 (explaining that well-reasoned opinions help to combat the ability of institu-
tional repeat players to “arbitrator-shop” at the expense of a one-time consumer grievant).
120. By rule, FINRA awards, AAA employment awards, and AAA class arbitration
awards are made publicly available. See Code of Arbitration Procedure for Customer Dis-
putes, FIN. INDUS. REGULATORY AUTH. (FINRA), Rule 12904(h), http://finra.complinet
.com/en/display/display_plain.html?rbid=2403&element_id=4192&record_id=17038 [https:/
/perma.cc/G5XN-HJ7D] (“All awards shall be made publicly available.”) [hereinafter
FINRA Customer Disputes Code]; AAA’S EMPLOYMENT ARBITRATION RULES, supra note
88, at 29 (“An award issued under these rules shall be publicly available, on a cost basis.
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the AAA has published over 2,000 reasoned written employment arbitra-
tion awards.121 While it is true that the publication of reasoned written
opinions partially undermines the “confidentiality” aspect of arbitration,
the benefits of turning the opinion into a public good outweigh the costs
to the disputants (if those disputants even care about whether the deci-
sion is published). The history of publication in labor arbitration and,
more recently, in employment arbitration, suggests that opinion publica-
tion does little to deter parties from participating in the process. FINRA,
which administers securities arbitration, has always published awards, but
these awards historically failed to shed much light on the arbitrators’ de-
cision-making processes. FINRA recently changed its rules, tacitly ac-
knowledging the importance of a published reasoned written opinion by
offering such opinions to parties at no cost to them. This change, together
with the extensive publication of employment and labor arbitration rea-
soned opinions, offers further support to the assertion that publication is
inexpensive relative to the benefits achieved through publication.
1. Reasoned Written Opinions Enhance Accountability in the Decision-
Making Process
Reasoned opinions help parties understand why they have won or lost
in arbitration122 and, also, may help the losing party accept an adverse
award.123 Availability of a reasoned opinion may also serve to strengthen
The names of the parties and witnesses will not be publicly available, unless a party ex-
pressly agrees to have its name made public in the award.”). In contrast, “most labor arbi-
tration awards are unpublished, and awards that are submitted to the BNA for publication
are published only if BNA decides the award is of sufficiently ‘general interest.’”
Weidemaier, supra note 93, at 1106. “Thus, labor awards are subject to several types of
selection not present in the other arbitration regimes. First, the arbitrator must decide
(with the parties’ assent) to submit the award to the BNA. Second, the BNA must decide
to publish the award. As a result, published BNA awards may not be representative of all
labor arbitration awards.” Id. at 1106–07. As Professor Weidemaier notes, some research
reveals higher management win rates in published than in unpublished awards. Id. at 1107
(citations omitted).
121. Id. at 1127. Since at least 2009, when AAA amended its Employment Arbitration
Rules and Mediation Procedures, Rule 39(b) has required that an “award issued under
these rules shall be publicly available, on a cost basis. The names of the parties and wit-
nesses will not be publicly available, unless a party expressly agrees to have its name made
public in the award.” AAA’S EMPLOYMENT ARBITRATION RULES, supra note 88, at 29.
LexisNexis advertised on the AAA website that it has a searchable database of over 2,000
employment arbitration decisions and over 8,500 labor arbitration decisions. See generally
LexisNexis for Labor & Employment, LEXISNEXIS, https://www.lexisnexis.com/en-us/prod-
ucts/labor-employment-portfolio.page [https://perma.cc/PZ9W-F43V]. It would seem that
most parties are already comfortable with the publication of arbitration decisions.
122. Even AAA concedes that parties sometimes want these decisions. Professor S.I.
Strong offers this justification for the reasoned award: “a well-written and fully reasoned
award may persuade the losing party that a decision is well-supported, even if the outcome
is negative.” Strong, supra note 106, at 86. “For disputants, reasoned decisions provide an
explanation that can be used to guide future conduct and a sense, perhaps especially im-
portant to the losing party, that the adjudicatory process was a deliberate and fair one.”
Weidemaier, supra note 115, at 1917.
123. Professor Kaczmarek states that “[a]ll sides generally agree that a sound opinion
contributes to the acceptance of an award by persuading the parties that the arbitrator
thoughtfully considered the claim and came to a well-reasoned decision.” Christopher B.
2017] Lost Promise of Arbitration 875
the parties’ faith in the integrity of the arbitral process because the par-
ties are able to see for themselves that the arbitrator considered the rele-
vant facts, and, if applicable, legal rules.124 In addition, when arbitrators
draft reasoned awards, the parties may review the award to ensure that
their facts and theories were heard and, hopefully, understood.125
Parties want explained decisions and greater transparency in decision-
making. Professors Barbara Black and Jill Gross, who initially contended
that written opinions, at least in the securities industry, were not a good
idea, changed their minds following their empirical study revealing that
customers wanted explanations of the arbitration awards and believed
they would be more satisfied if they received such explanations.126
Publishing reasoned written opinions not only makes transparent the
arbitration process but also may enhance the arbitrator’s accountability.
When a decision maker must write a reasoned opinion, she will analyze
the facts and relevant principles more critically and will take more care in
drafting her decision.127 In addition, an arbitrator who must write a rea-
soned opinion will likely pay greater attention to evidence and argument
presented at the hearing.128 Knowing that others will read the opinion
will also incentivize the arbitrator to reach her decision more carefully
and deliberately.129
Kaczmarek, Public Law Deserves Public Justice: Why Public Law Arbitrators Should Be
Required to Issue Written, Publishable Opinions, 4 EMP. RTS. & EMP. POL’Y J. 285, 297
(2000).
124. Thomas J. Stipanowich, Reflections on the State and Future of Commercial Arbitra-
tion: Challenges, Opportunities, Proposals, 25 AM. REV. INT’L ARB. 297, 327 (2014) (arbi-
trators want to follow the applicable law); Strong, supra note 106, at 87 (“[R]easoned
awards . . . enhance the legitimacy of the arbitral process in the eyes of the arbitrators, the
parties and the public by demonstrating the seriousness and integrity of the arbitral
endeavor.”).
125. See Martha I. Morgan, The Constitutional Right to Know Why, 17 HARV. C.R.-C.L.
L. REV. 297, 299 (1982). Mark Weidemaier suggested that a benefit of a reasoned award is
that parties will be more likely to view the award as legitimate and would comply volunta-
rily. Weidemaier, supra note 115, at 1918.
126. See Barbara Black, The Irony of Securities Arbitration Today: Why Do Brokerage
Firms Need Judicial Protection?, 72 U. CIN. L. REV. 415, 450–51 (2003) (explained deci-
sions are not useful); Gross & Black, supra note 113, at 39 (Fifty-five percent (55%) of
customers stated that they would be more satisfied with the outcome of their arbitration
had they received an explanation of the award).
127. See David M. Sanbonmatsu, Sharon A. Akimoto & Earlene Biggs, Overestimating
Causality: Attributional Effects of Confirmatory Processing, 65 J. PERS. & SOC. PSYCHOL.
892, 896 (1993); see generally Philip E. Tetlock, Linda Skitka & Richard Boettger, Social
and Cognitive Strategies for Coping with Accountability: Conformity, Complexity, and Bol-
stering, 57 J. PERS. & SOC. PSYCHOL. 632 (1989).
128. See Chris Guthrie, Jeffrey J. Rachlinski & Andrew Wistrich, Blinking on the
Bench: How Judges Decide Cases, 93 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 36–37 (2007). According to the
authors, “writing opinions could induce deliberation that otherwise would not occur . . . .
[T]he discipline of opinion writing might enable well-meaning judges to overcome their
intuitive, impressionistic reactions. The process of writing might challenge the judge to
assess a decision more carefully, logically and deductively.” Id. at 37. Applying these find-
ings to arbitrators would likely yield similar results. Arbitrators tend, like trial judges, to
develop intuitive reactions to evidence presented.
129. See id.; see also Inside the Arbitrator’s Mind, supra note 102, at 1175 (“The process
of opinion writing itself could also serve as a check on intuition and facilitate deliberation,
leading to higher quality outcomes. In those instances where arbitrators are not required
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2. Establishing Arbitrator Competence
One of the reasons Delgado offered for favoring formal processes is his
belief that judges are “professionals,” competent in adjudicating legal is-
sues.130 By contrast, historically, arbitrators were viewed as incapable of
resolving non-contractual issues.131 In the 1974 Alexander v. Gardner-
Denver decision, the Supreme Court famously pronounced that arbitra-
tors are experts in the “law of the shop, not the law of the land.”132 Un-
less the public and the parties to arbitration perceive arbitrators as
capable of analyzing and deciding legal issues, it would be difficult to
overcome the objections Delgado (and others) levied against arbitration
as an effective forum for minority disputants with legal or statutory
claims.
In fact, though, as arbitrators have increasingly adjudicated statutory
claims and legal issues, the process for creating a roster of arbitrators
changed so that greater experience in the law is virtually an essential re-
quirement. Today, the vast majority of commercial, employment, and
consumer arbitrators are legally trained and typically have fifteen or
more years of legal practice in the area in which they specialize.133 As the
kinds of disputes in arbitration changed, courts, too, have altered their
view of arbitrator competence. Between 1974 and today, the Court
moved from treating arbitrators as competent only to adjudicate contract
disputes to validating arbitral decisions involving a wide variety of statu-
by governing rules to write opinions, parties could contract for opinions if so inclined.
Parties also might mandate that tribunals include subsections in awards, follow prescribed
checklists, or provide substantive reasoning of critical, replicable issues, if the parties be-
lieve they would benefit from a more detailed and precise explication of decision-mak-
ing.”). Moreover:
[i]n arbitration, in contrast to litigation, parties can adopt procedural rules
and structures to enhance adjudicative quality and minimize the risk of deci-
sion error. For example, parties can structure procedures to give arbitrators
more time to devote to deliberation. Likewise, parties can draft arbitration
agreements to inject additional procedural rigor to decrease risks of error
from intuitive adjudication.
Id.
130. Delgado, supra note 1, at 1374. Delgado asserts that ADR decision makers are
“rarely professional.” Id.
131. At the time Mitsubishi and Prima Paint were decided, courts did not believe arbi-
trators were capable of resolving non-contractual issues. Thomas J. Stipanowich, Arbitra-
tion: The New Litigation, 2010 U. ILL. L. REV 1, 10 (2010) (citing Mitsubishi Motors Corp.
v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 633 (1985) and Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood
& Conklin Mfg., 388 U.S. 395 (1967)).
132. Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 57 (1974).
133. See Merit Ins. Co. v. Leatherby Ins. Co., 714 F.2d 673, 679 (1983) (“[P]eople who
arbitrate do so because they prefer a tribunal knowledgeable about the subject matter of
their dispute to a generalist court with its austere impartiality but limited knowledge of
subject matter. ‘The professional competence of the arbitrator is attractive to the business-
man because a commercial dispute arises out of an environment that usually possesses its
own folkways, mores, and technology. Most businessmen interviewed contended that com-
mercial disputes should be considered within the framework of such an environment. No
matter how determinedly judge and lawyer work to acquire an understanding of a given
business or industry, they cannot hope to approximate the practical wisdom distilled from
30 or 40 years of experience.’” (quoting AMERICAN MANAGEMENT ASS’N, RESOLVING
BUSINESS DISPUTES 51 (1965)).
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tory claims.134 By 2009, the Court declared that even labor arbitrators
were competent to apply external law.135
Empirical evidence also supports the contention that arbitrators are as
competent as judges in decision-making and use of precedent. In his arti-
cle analyzing arbitrator use of precedent,136 Professor Mark Weidemaier
debunked the common wisdom that arbitrators neither follow nor make
precedent. Examining arbitrators’ citation practices in securities, labor,
employment, and class action arbitration, Weidemaier found that arbitra-
tors, particularly in employment and class action arbitration cases, “rou-
tinely” wrote lengthy, reasoned awards, spending considerable time
analyzing legal issues and extensively using precedent.137 While some of
the cited precedent came from other arbitrators’ opinions, the majority of
cited precedent came from published judicial opinions. Professor
Weidemaier concluded that the available evidence supported the theory
that arbitrators and judges engage in similar types of decision-making and
opinion-writing.138
Professor Chris Drahozal reviewed the existing empirical studies in
2006 and found that arbitrators, when surveyed, reveal the same philoso-
phy about following the law when rendering a decision as do judges.139
Drahozal reported that judicial reversal rates of arbitration awards, even
when reviewed de novo, are remarkably similar to appellate court rever-
sal rates for lower court decisions.140 Thus, it would seem inappropriate
134. Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20 (1991) (holding that parties
could agree to arbitrate Age Discrimination in Employment Claims). Following Gilmer,
lower courts enforced agreements to arbitrate Civil Rights Act of 1991 claims, ADA
claims, and other statutory claims. See, e.g., EEOC v. Luce, Forward, Hamilton & Scripps,
345 F.3d 742 (9th Cir. 2003) (Civil Rights Act of 1991 claims may be arbitrated); Stipa-
nowich, supra note 131, at 10 (“[C]ourts vouchsafe to arbitrators the responsibility for . . .
vindication of rights under civil statutory schemes . . . and . . . laws designed to protect
employees and consumers.”).
135. 14 Penn Plaza LLC v. Pyett, 556 U.S. 247, 268–69 (2009) (“An arbitrator’s capacity
to resolve complex questions of fact and law extends with equal force to discrimination
claims brought under the ADEA.”) (citing Shearson/American Express Inc. v. McMahon,
482 U.S. 220, 231–32 (1987) (explaining that the Supreme Court of the United States has
“‘recognized that arbitral tribunals are readily capable of handling the factual and legal
complexities of antitrust claims, notwithstanding the absence of judicial instruction and
supervision’ and that ‘there is no reason to assume at the outset that arbitrators will not
follow the law.’”)); Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler–Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S.
614, 634 (1985) (“We decline to indulge the presumption that the parties and arbitral body
conducting a proceeding will be unable or unwilling to retain competent, conscientious,
and impartial arbitrators.”).
136. Professor Weidemaier reviewed over eight hundred arbitration opinions, evenly
divided among securities, labor, class action, and employment cases. Weidemaier, supra
note 93, at 1105.
137. Id. at 1095, 1139 (outside of securities disputes, “arbitrators wrote reasonably
lengthy decisions that were substantially devoted to legal analysis and made ample use of
precedent.”). In addition, Professor Weidemaier found that, outside of labor arbitration,
the “overwhelming majority” of awards cite judicial precedent. Id. at 1140. He found the
similarity between arbitrators’ opinions and judicial opinions “striking.” Id.
138. Id. at 1193–94.
139. Christopher Drahozal, Is Arbitration Lawless?, 40 Loy. L.A. L. Rev. 187, 214
(2006).
140. Id.
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to conclude that arbitrators understand the law any less than other poten-
tial decision makers.141
Professor Ariana Levinson’s work also rejects the common wisdom
that arbitrators, particularly in the unionized sector, are incapable of ana-
lyzing external or statutory law and explaining their application of law to
facts in a well-reasoned opinion. In her study of 160 labor arbitration
awards involving employment discrimination claims, Professor Levinson
found that “[t]he majority of cases reach outcomes that appear defensible
under the governing law, even if [the reader] does not agree with the
outcome.”142 Professor Levinson concluded that a mandatory system in
which labor arbitrators decide employment discrimination disputes, like
the one at issue in Pyett, is just.143
Current empirical studies, together with a changing judicial perception
of arbitrator competence, suggest that arbitrators are at least as capable,
if not more capable, than judges at resolving legal and statutory claims.
Although public perception of arbitrator competence may not have
changed as dramatically as judicial perception, educational efforts to pro-
mote arbitration, rather than disparage it, might help inform prospective
disputants about the benefits of the process. The efforts to utilize this
process for lower value disputes would only be enhanced if the arbitrators
wrote reasoned opinions. Nothing would increase faith in arbitrator com-
petence more than witnessing that competence on the printed page.
C. PUBLISHED REASONED WRITTEN OPINIONS ARE POSSIBLE
Unquestionably, the addition of a reasoned written opinion would en-
hance the integrity of the arbitral process, reduce the likelihood of biased
or prejudiced decision-making, increase the predictability of arbitrator
decisions, and assist parties in future arbitrator selection. But both minor-
ity disputants and one-shot players might object to the inclusion of this
requirement if it increased costs of the arbitral process. Concerns regard-
ing cost may be overblown, however. Arbitration jurisprudence strongly
suggests that the party implementing the arbitration agreement may have
141. Drahozal also reported on a study, conducted by Patricia Greenfield, which re-
viewed 106 cases decided between 1980 and 1985 where at least one party had filed an
unfair labor practice charge with the NLRB. Id. at 195. Greenfield found in her study that
although half of the arbitrators cited external law in their opinions, most of the arbitrators’
analysis of external law was cursory or conclusory. Id. at 195–96. Greenfield’s study would
seem to be of limited value given its age and focus on unfair labor practice charges. Further
empirical studies, particularly of labor arbitration awards, would be helpful in assessing
whether or not arbitrators follow the law, particularly when statutory discrimination claims
are at issue.
142. Ariana R. Levinson, What the Awards Tell Us About Labor Arbitration of Em-
ployment Discrimination Claims, 46 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 789, 831 (2013). Of the 111
cases involving statutes, 71 (64%) cited legal authority other than a statute. Id. at 830.
Thirteen cited EEOC regulations or guidelines, and “twenty-six cited other arbitration de-
cisions.” Id. Forty decisions cited the relevant statute but no legal authority. Id. at 831.
143. Id. at 858. Despite this conclusion, Professor Levinson nevertheless recommends
increased procedural protections in arbitration, including access to greater discovery and
recourse for arbitrators’ clearly erroneous statements of law. Id.
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an obligation to pay all costs and fees in excess of what a one-shot player
would pay in court.144 AAA and JAMS, the two most prominent arbitra-
tor provider organizations, adopted employment and consumer due pro-
cess protocols mandating that the business and/or employer pay for the
arbitration process to the extent that its costs exceeds the cost of a
trial.145 If opinions were also mandated, arbitration costs would then in-
clude the time for the arbitrator to write the opinion.
Even if courts did not limit the consumer’s obligation to what the con-
sumer might pay in court, the costs of a written opinion are not as high as
one might initially expect. Useful empirical evidence exists regarding the
costs of adding the reasoned written opinion procedure. FINRA created
a process called “explained decision.”146 Initially, the parties had to agree
to request an explained decision, and it would cost the parties $400 (the
rule states that arbitrators may allocate the cost).147 In January 2017,
FINRA offered further incentive to parties to request an explained deci-
144. See AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333, 351–52 (2011) (conditioning
decision to enforce a class action waiver contained in a consumer arbitration agreement on
the business’s willingness to pay all or most of the consumer’s costs and fees); Cole v.
Burns Int’l Sec. Servs, 105 F.3d 1465, 1485 (D.C. Cir. 1997); Shankle v. B-G Maint. Mgmt.
of Colo., Inc., 163 F.3d 1230, 1234–35 (10th Cir. 1999) (employee should not have to pay
one-half of arbitrator’s $250 per hour fee); Paladino v. Avnet Computer Tech., Inc., 134
F.3d 1054, 1062 (11th Cir. 1998) (employee should not have to pay $2,000 filing fee and
one-half the arbitrator’s fee); Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 279 F.3d 889, 894 (9th Cir.
2002) (requirement that an employee pay half the arbitrator’s fee rendered the arbitration
agreement unenforceable); Ball v. SFX Broad., Inc., 165 F. Supp. 2d 230, 240 (N.D.N.Y.
2001) (likelihood of significant arbitration costs, which would not be incurred in a judicial
forum, rendered the arbitration agreement unenforceable).
145. AAA’s consumer due process protocol, Principle 6, states that consumers should
pay only “reasonable costs.” See AAA’S CONSUMER DUE PROCESS PROTOCOL, supra note
83, at 2. The full principle states, “Providers of goods and services should develop ADR
programs which entail reasonable cost to Consumers based on the circumstances of the
dispute, including, among other things, the size and nature of the claim, the nature of
goods or services provided, and the ability of the Consumer to pay. In some cases, this may
require the Provider to subsidize the process.” Id. Although declining to set absolute
guidelines, AAA, in its commentary to Principle 6, states, “[i]nIn some cases, the need to
ensure reasonable costs for the Consumer will require the Provider of goods or services to
subsidize the costs of ADR which is mandated by the agreement. Indeed, many companies
today deem it appropriate to pay most or all of the costs of ADR procedures for claims
and disputes involving individual employees.” Id. at 18 (citing Mei L. Bickner, et al., Devel-
opments in Employment Arbitration, 52 DISP. RESOL. J. 8 (1997)). AAA’s Employment
Arbitration Rules and Mediation Procedures states that for disputes arising out of an em-
ployer-promulgated plan, “[t]he employer shall pay the arbitrator’s compensation.”
AAA’S EMPLOYMENT ARBITRATION RULES, supra note 88, at 33. Filing fees are capped at
$200 when it is the employee filing a claim. Id.
146. See FINRA Customer Disputes Code, supra note 120.
147. See id. The following version of FINRA Rule 12904 applies to decisions after April
2, 2017:
(g) Explained Decisions
(1) This paragraph (g) applies only when all parties jointly request an ex-
plained decision.
(2) An explained decision is a fact-based award stating the general reason(s)
for the arbitrators’ decision. Inclusion of legal authorities and damage calcu-
lations is not required.
(3) Parties must make any request for an explained decision no later than
the time for the prehearing exchange of documents and witness lists under
Rule 12514(d).
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sion, offering the option to them at no additional cost.148
The quantification of opinion costs provides claimants with a strong
argument that the additional costs of the written opinion are relatively
small compared to the accrued benefits of the new practice—greater ac-
countability of arbitrators, claimants’ increased belief in the fairness of
the arbitral process, ability of claimants to change their future behavior to
avoid additional legal difficulty, and ability of either party to present an
effective appeal.
IV. DIVERSITY IN ARBITRATION
Delgado’s seminal article critiquing dispute resolution as an alternative
to the traditional judicial process does not address the importance of di-
versity among decision makers and facilitators as a basis for ensuring pro-
cess integrity. Perhaps that is in part because Delgado believed that the
formal structure of the American legal system reduces bias and prejudice
to such a degree149 that it is less important to have diverse judges.150 Al-
(4) The chairperson of the panel will be responsible for writing the explained
decision.
(5) The chairperson will receive an additional honorarium of $400 for writ-
ing the explained decision, as required by this paragraph (g). The panel will
allocate the cost of the chairperson’s honorarium to the parties as part of the
final award.
FINRA currently states that the parties will not be charged the $400 fee for the chair to
write the opinion. See id.
148. See Option for an Explained Decision at No Additional Cost, FIN. INDUS. REGULA-
TORY AUTH. (FINRA), https://www.finra.org/arbitration-and-mediation/option-explained-
decision-no-additional-cost [https://perma.cc/AV6K-VGBS] (“Starting January 3, 2017, if
the parties jointly request an explained decision, FINRA will waive the $400 fee to the
parties for an explained decision. An explained decision is a fact-based award stating the
general reason(s) for the arbitrators’ decision. See Rules 12904(g) and 13904(g). Legal au-
thorities and damage calculations are not required. Parties must make the joint request for
an explained decision twenty days before the date of the first scheduled hearing. See Rules
12514(d) and 13514(d). The panel chairperson will write the explained decision and receive
an additional honorarium of $400 for doing so. See Rules 12214(e) and 13214(e). Under
Rules 12904(g) and 13904(g), the panel is permitted to allocate the cost of the chairper-
son’s $400 honorarium for writing the explained decision to the parties as part of the final
award. Under this initiative, however, if the parties jointly request an explained decision,
the panel chairperson will receive the $400 honorarium for writing the explained decision
but the parties will not be charged. View Regulatory Notice 09-16 to obtain more informa-
tion about Explained Decisions.”). As FINRA articulates it, “[a]n explained decision is a
fact-based award stating the general reason(s) for the arbitrators’ decision.” Regulatory
Notice: Explained Arbitration Decisions, FIN. INDUS. REGULATORY AUTH. (FINRA) (Mar.
2009), http://www.finra.org/sites/default/files/NoticeDocument/p118141.pdf [https://perma
.cc/ZW9V-VGAG]. Legal authorities and damage calculations are not required. Id. Parties
must make the joint request for an explained decision twenty days before the date of the
first scheduled hearing. Id. The panel chairperson will write the explained decision and
receive an additional honorarium of $400 for doing so.” Id.
149. Delgado emphasized that the internal and external constraints of the American
litigation system “are designed to keep a judge from exhibiting bias or prejudice.” Del-
gado, supra note 1, at 1367. Perhaps this means that judges may be biased or prejudiced,
but the rules preclude them from acting on their biases or prejudices. Thus, there is less of
a need for diversity among judges.
150. Professor Gary Spitko, by contrast, suggests that cultural minorities sometimes
fear traditional litigation processes because the legal system is dominated by “majority-
culture personnel (most notably including judges and jurors).” E. Gary Spitko, Gone but
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ternatively, Delgado may simply have avoided tackling the issue of the
gender or race of the decision maker at the time he and his co-authors
drafted the article. Whatever the reason, thirty years later, both minority
disputants and one-shot players believe that the lack of diversity among
arbitrators undermines the integrity of the arbitration process.151 Given
arbitration’s already less formal structure, one method for enhancing its
legitimacy among minority disputants, and one-shot players more gener-
ally, would be to ensure greater diversity among those empowered to
make decisions.152 Increasing diversity of neutral rosters will likely im-
prove the public’s perception of fairness and impartiality of the arbitra-
tion process.153
Critics of arbitration accurately observe that the arbitrator corps is not
particularly diverse in composition, either by sex or by race.154 Institu-
Not Conforming: Protecting the Abhorrent Testator from Majoritarian Cultural Norms
Through Minority-Culture Arbitration, 49 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 275, 275 (1999).
151. David Hoffman and Lamont Stallworth observed that “the lack of racial and eth-
nic diversity in the ranks of neutrals may cause society to lose confidence in the fairness of
private dispute resolution, leading legislators, regulators and the courts to reverse the poli-
cies that now support ADR.” David A. Hoffman & Lamont E. Stallworth, Leveling the
Playing Field for Workplace Neutrals: A Proposal for Achieving Racial and Ethnic Diver-
sity, 63 DISP. RESOL. J. 37, 39 (2008); see Theodore K. Cheng, The Case for Bringing Diver-
sity to the Selection of the ADR Neutrals, N.J. ST. BAR ASS’N 2, http://nysbar.com/blogs/
ResolutionRoundtable/The%20Case%20for%20Bringing%20Diversity%20to%20the%20
Selection%20of%20ADR%20Neutrals%20(T%20%20Cheng).pdf [https://perma.cc/
RG2F-RX47]; Beth Trent, Deborah Masucci & Timothy Lewis, The Dismal State of Diver-
sity: Mapping a Chart for Change, 21 DISP. RESOL. MAG. 21, 21 (2014); Maria R. Volpe,
Robert A. Baruch Bush, Gene A. Johnson Jr., Christopher M. Kwok, Janice Trudy-Jackson
& Roberto Velez, Barriers to Participation: Challenges Faced by Members of Under-
represented Racial and Ethnic Groups in Entering, Remaining, and Advancing in the ADR
Field, 35 FORDHAM URB. L. J. 119, 119–21 (2008); Stipanowich, supra note 124, at 377
(“[I]dentity and background of decision makers makes a difference and our growing un-
derstanding of the impact of these elements on process and product in dispute resolution
must be communicated and translated into action.”).
152. Commentators have observed that the diversity of the arbitrator corps has not
kept up with the change in the diversity of the workforce. The lack of diversity among
arbitrators undermines the credibility of the process because disputants do not believe that
the arbitrators can identify with their reality as employees or consumers. Floyd Weather-
spoon, The Impact of the Growth and Use of ADR Processes on Minority Communities,
Individual Rights, and Neutrals, 39 CAP. U. L. REV. 789, 801 (2011) (white males comprise
the vast majority of the arbitrator pool, especially in construction, labor, and commercial
disputes); Sasha A. Carbone & Jeffrey T. Zaino, Increasing Diversity Among Arbitrators: A
Guideline to What the New Arbitrator and ADR Community Should Be Doing to Achieve
This Goal, N.Y. STATE BAR ASS’N J. 33, 33–34 (2012) (citing Gwynne A. Wilcox of Levy
Ratner, P.C. in New York City).
153. Jennifer Coffman, The American Arbitration Association’s Commitment to Diver-
sity, 63 D.R.J. 31 (2008).
154. Ben Hancock, A Look at ADR and Diversity; Older White Males Lead the Ranks
of Neutrals, 39 NAT’L L. J. 1, 1 (October 10, 2016) (stating that the arbitrator corp is “ar-
guably the least diverse corner of the legal profession;” most arbitrators, especially in high
stakes disputes, are older white males.); F. Peter Phillips, It Remains a White Male Game,
INT’L INST. FOR CONFLICT PREVENTION & RESOL. (Nov. 27, 2006), https://www.cpradr.org/
news-publications/articles/2006-11-27-it-remains-a-white-male-game-nlj [https://perma.cc/
4TAD-SAZL]; see Deborah Rothman, Gender Diversity in Arbitrator Selection, 18 NO. 3
DISP. RESOL. MAG. 22, 23 (2012); see also David H. Burt & Laura A. Kaster, Why Bringing
Diversity to ADR Is a Necessity, INT’L INST. FOR CONFLICT PREVENTION & RESOL. (Sept.
30, 2013), https://www.cpradr.org/news-publications/articles/2013-09-30-why-bringing-di-
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tional efforts to alter this dynamic have been largely ineffective.155 Here,
this article will review efforts to diversify the arbitrator corps and attempt
to explain why these efforts have been relatively unsuccessful. This article
will also suggest an alternative to the current, failed effort to diversify. If
greater diversity among arbitrators might help minority and other dispu-
tants find arbitration an acceptable substitute forum, it is certainly worth
the exploration.156
The dispute resolution community and the organizations providing
neutral services agree that parties to arbitration should have the opportu-
nity to select an arbitrator from a diverse roster of neutrals. In response,
several arbitral organizations committed to increasing diversity among
the arbitrators on their rosters. AAA, the largest neutral provider organi-
zation, states that part of its mission is the creation and maintenance of a
diverse neutral roster.157 In 2012, AAA reported that its Roster of Neu-
trals was twenty-three percent (23%) diverse for gender and race.158
AAA also established a one-year fellowship for newer dispute resolution
professionals from historically underrepresented groups. This program,
the A. Leon Higginbotham Jr. Fellows Program, is intended “to provide
training, mentorship and networking opportunities to up and coming di-
verse alternative dispute resolution professionals who have historically
not been included in meaningful participation in the field of alternative
dispute resolution.”159 JAMS also touts its commitment to diversity. Ac-
cording to its website, it “outpace[s] The AmLaw 250 with an overall
composition of 22% female and 9% persons of color among our distin-
versity-to-adr-is-a-necessity-acc [Perma link unavailable]. FINRA arbitrators are not di-
verse either: “There are 6,383 arbitrators, according to FINRA. PIABA’s analysis of
disclosure reports for 5,375 past and current securities arbitrators from as far back as 1991
found that 80 percent of arbitrators were male. PIABA also analyzed 2,118 disclosure re-
ports it had complied [sic] from 2013–14. Of those, the average age was 66 and more than
78 percent were men.” Suzanne Barlyn, Wall Street Arbitrators’ Lack of Diversity is Harm-
ful: Group, REUTERS (Oct. 7, 2014, 9:41 AM), http://www.reuters.com/article/us-finra-arbi-
tration-idUSKCN0HW1EM20141007 [https://perma.cc/52V8-7PEH]. The College of
Commercial Arbitrators, a group of experienced arbitrators, has little gender diversity.
Fifteen percent (15%) of CCA arbitrators are women. Stipanowich, supra note 124, at
363–64 (Of the 234 members, 36 are female).
155. F. Peter Phillips, Diversity in ADR: More Difficult to Accomplish Than First
Thought, 15 NO. 3 DISP. RESOL. MAG. 14, 14 (2009).
156. To ensure public acceptance of arbitration as an appropriate substitute for litiga-
tion, arbitrators should be representative of the individual litigants who appear in front of
them. See Burt & Kaster, supra note 154; Weatherspoon, supra note 152, at 801 (“The lack
of diversity [among] neutrals raises suspicions among minorities who must use the ADR
process to resolve their dispute.”).
157. The AAA’s Diversity Committee’s Mission states that: “The mission of the AAA
Diversity Committee is to promote the inclusion of those individuals who historically have
been excluded from meaningful and active participation in the alternative dispute resolu-
tion (ADR) field.” Diversity Initiatives, AM. ARBITRATION ASS’N, https://www.adr.org/
diversityinitiatives [https://perma.cc/KD4W-3L3N].
158. Carbone & Zaino, supra note 152, at 34.
159. AAA Higginbotham Fellows Program, AM. ARBITRATION ASS’N, https://www.adr
.org/HiggibothamFellowsProgram [https://perma.cc/K8VP-BP6A].
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guished panelists.”160 JAMS encourages the businesses with whom it
works to consider using gender and racially diverse neutrals, track usage
of diverse neutrals, and encourage outside counsel to “consider diversity
in their selection of ADR professionals.”161 CPR, another major provider
of dispute resolution services, created a “diversity pledge.” Signatories to
this pledge confirm their belief in the importance of diversity and inclu-
sion among neutrals and actively support selecting diverse arbitrators and
mediators in matters in which they are involved. It also asks that other
parties to disputes include “qualified diverse neutrals among any list” of
neutrals they propose to the signatories.162  More recently, acknowledg-
ing that the only path to diversity in dispute resolution is ensuring that
diverse candidates are selected as arbitrators, CPR, together with FINRA
and the Leadership Council on Legal Diversity, launched a program in-
tended to train diverse candidates to become mediators and arbitra-
tors.163  The program, which began in a pilot form in 2016, provides
diverse participants the opportunity to develop neutral skills and gain ac-
cess to professional dispute resolution opportunities through, “(a) formal
training in mediation and arbitration skills and practical observational ex-
perience; (b) mentoring by skilled neutrals; and (c) networking opportu-
nities within CPR’s commercial dispute resolution community via
attendance at these organization’s events at no cost or at a discount.”164
For each of these organizations, the focus seems to be on diversifying
the arbitration roster and, at the same time, encouraging clients to com-
mit to selecting arbitrators who are diverse. Commentators offer addi-
tional suggestions to the major providers, encouraging them to offer
training and mentoring to female or minority arbitrators.165 They also
recommend that minority or female arbitrators, if interested in being se-
lected, should do pro bono or reduced fee work and speak or teach for
the lawyers and business people who might ultimately be responsible for
selecting arbitrators.166 While all of these suggestions are useful, they do
not seem sufficient to overcome the major obstacle facing any prospec-
tive arbitrator on a roster—being selected. The commitment to diversify-
ing the roster and offering mentoring, training, and networking,
160. Diversity, JUDICIAL ARBITRATION AND MEDIATION SERVS., http://www.jamsadr
.com/diversity/ [https://perma.cc/W4YX-LAJL].
161. Id.
162. Burt & Kaster, supra note 154.
163. CPR, LCLD & FINRA Program Aims for Actual Selection, Not Just Training, of
Diverse Neutrals, INT’L INST. FOR CONFLICT PREVENTION & RESOLUTION (CPR) (Sept. 14,
2017), https://blog.cpradr.org/ [https://perma.cc/2GYB-VQ6G].  In 2016, the program
trained six participants.  In 2017, five participants are enrolled. Id.
164. Id.
165. See Rothman, supra note 154, at 26; Carbone & Zaino, supra note 152, at 34–35;
Gina Viola Brown & Andrea K. Schneider, Gender Differences in Dispute Resolution Prac-
tice: Report on the ABA Section of Dispute Resolution Practice Snapshot Survey, MARQ.
UNIV. LAW SCHOOL LEGAL STUDIES RESEARCH PAPER NO. 14-04, at 21 (Jan. 31, 2014)
(clients and lawyers should use presumption in favor of selecting a gender diverse neutral
on multi-member panels).
166. Carbone & Zaino, supra note 152, at 35.
884 SMU LAW REVIEW [Vol. 70
admirable as it is, is unlikely to change who is selected to be an
arbitrator.167
Neither are entreaties that businesses select arbitrators from diverse
backgrounds likely to change selection outcomes. It is odd that busi-
nesses, who long ago committed to ensuring diversity in their business
and hiring practices,168 often abandon that commitment when selecting
neutrals.169 Institutional expression of a commitment to the selection of
qualified neutrals does not seem to translate into the selection of diverse
neutrals.170 So, it would seem unlikely that leaving the selection process
to the businesses will result in increased diversity among selected neu-
trals.171 Even with lists that include diverse neutrals, businesses seem to
default to arbitrators with whom they are familiar or who look like
them.172 This approach results predominantly in the selection of older,
white male arbitrators, since these arbitrators have been around the long-
est and likely have the most experience and name recognition.173 So, how
can diversity among selected neutrals be achieved?
167. Deborah Rothman explained that women arbitrators are rarely selected because
women are not well-represented among major litigation partners and in-house counsel,
those most likely to select arbitrators. Rothman, supra note 154, at 24. Also working
against women arbitrators is that most major law firms keep records and information about
arbitrators they have previously selected. Because a lawyer does not want to be blamed for
picking an arbitrator who others are unfamiliar with, new arbitrators, like many women
and minorities, are often overlooked. Id. at 24–25. Rothman also suggests that implicit bias
may prevent well-qualified women from being selected as arbitrators. Id. at 25.
168. Theodore K. Cheng has noted that corporations, and their legal departments, have
committed to diversity, often requesting that proposals for legal work include diversity
among those who are anticipated to work on the matter. Cheng, supra note 151, at 2. See
also Weatherspoon, supra note 152, at 803 (“Even when highly experienced minority neu-
trals gain placement on ADR rosters, they rarely are scheduled to serve.”).
169. See Burt & Kaster, supra note 114. Cheng observes this phenomenon as well, not-
ing that “corporations persist in pursuing an outdated approach to the selection of diverse
neutrals,” often outsourcing selection, together with the drafting of dispute resolution
clauses, to outside counsel. See Cheng, supra note 151, at 2.
170. Twenty-two percent (22%) of JAMS mediators and arbitrators selected for cases
are diverse by gender. Chris Poole, Why Diversity Matters in ADR, JAMS ADR BLOG
(July 18, 2012), http://www.jamsadr.com/blog/2012/why-diversity-matters-in-adr [https://per
ma.cc/T8CU-UX5F] (data contained within linked presentation).
171. Chris Poole, Talking Diversity: An Important Topic for ADR, JAMS ADR BLOG
(July 14, 2011), https://www.jamsadr.com/blog/2011/talking-diversity-an-important-topic-
for-adr [https://perma.cc/S4SU-VH4D] (“[T]he problem [with arbitrator selection] stems
from the fact that attorneys are typically most comfortable recommending to clients . . .
[an] arbitrator they have previously worked with.”). Poole also raised the issue of supply.
Id. Fewer minorities and women appear on JAMS rosters because JAMS draws most of its
arbitrators from judges and senior partners at law firms with ADR experience, and those
groups are underrepresented in those careers. Id.
172. Hancock, supra note 154, at 1 (quoting an arbitrator on the JAMS roster who said
that “attorneys [are driven] to select not only neutrals who are retired judges or former
litigators with established track records . . . but individuals who share their background
[and are] ‘a mirror image of themselves.’”).
173. Lawyers in law firms or in-house counsel control the disputes in arbitration. Be-
cause these “gatekeepers” are disproportionately white, “they tend to appoint someone
like themselves, someone white, a lawyer, and usually male.” Hoffman & Stallworth, supra
note 151, at 37, 41. Prejudice, together with concern about the quality of minority and
female neutrals may also be an issue. Weatherspoon, supra note 152, at 802–03.
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Concerns about the lack of diversity in the arbitrator corps may have
the greatest impact on minority disputants in cases where they face more
powerful and experienced opponents—for example, in consumer and em-
ployment disputes. Two possible solutions might address the lack of di-
versity among arbitrators in these kinds of cases. First, arbitral
institutions, like AAA, might consider expanding their rules to permit
direct appointment of arbitrators in certain kinds of cases.174 AAA has
already moved in that direction. Since 2014, AAA’s consumer arbitration
rules authorize AAA to appoint an arbitrator from its national roster in
disputes involving a claim of $10,000 or less rather than allow the parties
to select the arbitrator using the traditional striking process.175 Although
AAA follows the parties’ selection process, most parties incorporate
AAA’s rules into their contracts rather than create their own selection
process.176 Because AAA has made strides in increasing the diversity of
174. JAMS rules simply assure consumers that they will have “a reasonable opportunity
to participate in the process of choosing the arbitrator(s).” JAMS Policy on Consumer
Arbitrations Pursuant to Pre-Dispute Clauses Minimum Standards of Procedural Fairness,
Judicial Arbitration and Mediation Servs. (July 15, 2009), https://www.jamsadr.com/con-
sumer-minimum-standards/ [https://perma.cc/6W74-A4NZ]. The AAA’s new rules differ
from the approach taken in traditional arbitration. In traditional arbitration, an arbitral
institution provides a list of three or more arbitrators to the parties. The parties alternately
strike names until one arbitrator remains. This arbitrator is appointed to hear the case.
This process does not typically result in the appointment of an arbitrator from a diverse
background because the more experienced party will strike arbitrators with whom it is
unfamiliar. As a result, the appointed arbitrator is more likely to be an experienced, well-
known arbitrator. In the United States, the typical experienced, well-known arbitrator is an
older, white male.
175. Under AAA Consumer Arbitration Rule 16, this appointment process is a default
rule. If the parties identify another approach to selection, AAA will follow that approach.
In addition, the rule enables either party to object to an arbitrator’s appointment. AAA
Consumer Arbitration Rules, supra note 101, at 18 (Rule 16, Appointment from National
Roster). Prior to 2014, AAA appointed an arbitrator if the parties failed to identify a
different process for arbitrator selection but did not indicate which roster AAA would use
to appoint the arbitrator. See Consumer-Related Disputes Supplementary Procedures, AM.
ARBITRATION ASS’N, at 9 (Sept. 15, 2005), https://www.adr.org/sites/default/files/Consum
er-Related%20Disputes%20Supplementary%20Procedures%20Sep%2015%2C%202005
.pdf [https://perma.cc/L567-5TWG].
176. See Consumer Clause Registry, AM. ARBITRATION ASS’N, https://www.adr.org/sim
plefileandpay/faces/oracle/webcenter/portalapp/pages/clauseRegistry.jspx?_afrLoop=23318
9466242335&_afrWindowMode=0&_afrWindowId=null#!%40%40%3F_afrWindowId%
3Dnull%26_afrLoop%3D233189466242335%26_afrWindowMode%3D0%26_adf.ctrl-
state%3D19p6rw3kok_4 [https://perma.cc/TD6L-3CJC] [hereinafter “AAA Consumer
Clause Registry”]. Since 2014, AAA mandates that any business wishing to use AAA arbi-
trators and administrative services pay a fee to have their consumer arbitration clause re-
viewed by AAA. Once AAA reviews the clause and finds that its content is consistent with
AAA rules and the Due Process Protocol, the clause is included in the Consumer Clause
Registry. See id. Three hundred thirty-nine (339) companies have their clauses included in
the Registry. Id. AAA will not administer any arbitration for a company whose arbitration
clause is not compliant with AAA’s minimum standards for due process. Id. A review of
the Consumer Clause Registry demonstrates that most businesses allow AAA to appoint
the arbitrator in consumer disputes. For example, 1st Franklin Financial Corporation per-
mits the AAA to appoint the arbitrator. See id; see also Alternative Dispute Resolution
(Arbitration) Agreement for 1st Franklin Financial Corporation, https://www.adr.org/sim-
plefileandpay/docopenservlet?DocID=19084419——NYV-PMPRODUCM26151627—No
—Y%20&&%20MainContentId=NYV-PMPRODUCM26151627%20&&%20NewFlag=
No&_afrLoop=758204488433367 [https://perma.cc/7XXQ-4HNX].
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its arbitrator roster and most entities who use AAA opt in to AAA’s
default rules, one would expect to see greater diversity among the arbi-
trators actually appointed to cases. Unfortunately, though, the reach of
this rule is limited because a $10,000 demand is a relatively low value
claim and the rules authorizing AAA to appoint the arbitrator are limited
to consumer disputes.177 In an employment dispute, by contrast, AAA
will follow the traditional process for arbitrator selection. AAA sends out
a roster of arbitrators, diverse by gender and race.178 Next, the parties
rank these arbitrators in order of preference. Then, AAA appoints the
arbitrator with the highest composite ranking.179 This process provides no
guarantee that a diverse arbitrator will be chosen. One way to improve
diversity among arbitrators selected to hear cases would be for AAA, and
other major arbitral institutions like JAMS and CPR, to adopt AAA’s
approach to arbitrator appointment for low value cases, but increase the
threshold demand associated with arbitrator appointment to, for exam-
ple, $100,000 claims. The institutional providers could also expand this
direct arbitrator appointment program to include employment cases. Par-
ties could still opt out of the arbitrator appointment rule but, if they
failed to do so, would be much more likely to see an arbitrator of a differ-
ent gender or race presiding over their dispute.
Another possible solution to the lack of diversity among arbitrators
would be to create a greater number of permanent panels of arbitrators
reflecting the diversity of the population at large.180 Permanent panels
are already a staple of labor arbitration in both the public and private
sectors.181 Each side, union and management, identifies potential arbitra-
177. In an extensive study of consumer arbitration cases, Professor David Horton found
that only twenty-four percent (24%) of AAA consumer claims involved demands for
$10,000 or less. See David Horton & Andrea Cann Chandrasekher, After the Revolution:
An Empirical Study of Consumer Arbitration, 104 GEO. L.J. 57, 92 (2015) (mean demand
was $143,962). An earlier study, conducted by Searle, found that the mean demand was
$46,131 with thirty-one percent (31%) of claimants making a claim for $10,000 or less. Id.
Note that not all the businesses limit AAA’s power to appoint to claims of $10,000 or less.
See AAA Consumer Clause Registry, supra note 176. For example, 1st Franklin Financial
Corporation does not identify a claim limit. See id.; see also Alternative Dispute Resolution
(Arbitration) Agreement, supra note 176.
178. See AAA’S EMPLOYMENT ARBITRATION RULES, supra note 88, at 20 (“Number,
Qualifications and Appointment of Neutral Arbitrators”).
179. Id. (Rule 12(c) (i–iii)).
180. As David Hoffman has noted, permanent panels are one of the three types of
workplace dispute resolution. The other two approaches involve the use of an independent
organization, like AAA or JAMS, to supply a list of prospective arbitrators. A third ap-
proach is to select arbitrators ad hoc as cases arise. Hoffman & Stallworth, supra note 151,
at 38. In labor and employment disputes, parties may “agree on a single individual to serve
as a permanent umpire to handle all arbitration disputes or a permanent panel of arbitra-
tors from whom they will select an individual to hear a particular matter.” Timothy J.
Heinsz, Judicial Review of Labor Arbitration Awards: The Enterprise Wheel Goes Around
and Around, 52 MO. L. REV. 243, 298 n.161 (1987) (permanent panel of arbitrators used
frequently in labor arbitration).
181. The American Federation of Government Employees and the Social Security Ad-
ministration, for example, maintain a permanent panel of arbitrators. FMCS notes on its
website that some collective bargaining agreements require creation of a panel of arbitra-
tors. Arbitration & Notice Processing, FEDERAL MEDIATION & CONCILIATION SERVICE,
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tors. Both sides vet the arbitrators and, if they are acceptable to both
sides, randomly assign (or assign by rotation) the panel arbitrators to ar-
bitrations as disputes arise, typically over a period of time, such as the life
of the collective bargaining agreement.182 Because both union and man-
agement are committed to creation of a diverse panel, parties are much
more likely to see women or minority arbitrators than they would if the
panel were created by a private arbitral organization. Other institutions
utilize permanent panels for certain kinds of cases, usually those that are
less complex. As in the labor-management context, the permanent panel
arbitrators are assigned on a rotating basis to cases, and both sides must
agree that an arbitrator may become a member of a permanent panel.183
Arbitrator panels create greater diversity in arbitrator selection, as op-
posed to the current approach in most consumer and employment cases,
which focuses only on diversification of arbitrator rosters.
Establishing a permanent panel of arbitrators to enhance diversity
among arbitrators handling employment disputes is not a new idea. In
2008, David Hoffman and Lamont Stallworth recommended the creation
of national and regional arbitrator panels as a way to improve the diver-
sity of arbitrator rosters. But their article focused primarily on the ques-
tion of how to improve recruitment, selection, and mentoring of minority
dispute resolution professionals. The authors identified two programs de-
signed to achieve these goals: Access ADR and a National Consortium of
Minority Workplace Neutrals.184 While there is no doubt that increasing
the number of minority dispute resolution professionals is a laudable
goal, these organizations have not been terribly successful because they
exist separate and apart from the mainstream dispute resolution provid-
ers.185 To change the nature of arbitrator rosters that parties actually
use—and, more importantly, the arbitrators they select—businesses, con-
sumer and employee groups, along with the dispute resolution providers,
must work together to achieve the same goal. Resources providing access
to minority or gender-diverse neutrals are a mere starting point. Only if
permanent panels of diverse neutrals are created by the arbitral institu-
tions, together with support from businesses and input from employees,
https://www.fmcs.gov/aboutus/agency-departments/arbitration-services-notice-processing/
[https://perma.cc/MU2C-C5DZ]. Charles A. Borell, How Unions Can Improve Their Suc-
cess Rate in Labor Arbitration, 61 DISP. RESOL. J. 28, 31 (2006) (permanent panels com-
mon in labor arbitration); Stephen L. Hayford, The Coming Third Era of Labor
Arbitration, 48 ARB. J. 8, 9 (1993) (large numbers of permanent panels in labor arbitra-
tion); Heinsz, supra note 180, at 298.
182. In the unionized context, the parties might create a permanent panel of arbitrators
to adjudicate grievances during the life of the collective bargaining agreement. Another
approach is to create a list of arbitrators, one of whom must decide the dispute. Permanent
panels may be used in complex commercial construction projects, too, where speedy reso-
lution is essential. Ariana R. Levinson, What the Awards Tell Us About Labor Arbitration
of Employment-Discrimination Claims, 46 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 789, 859 n.148 (2013).
183. See Carbone & Zaino, supra note 152, at 37 (describing permanent panels).
184. Hoffman & Stallworth, supra note 151, at 43.
185. I could find no evidence that either of these organizations still exist in a search of
the Internet in 2016.
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consumers, and the entities that advocate on their behalf, might we expe-
rience the kind of diversity among arbitrators that will make the arbitra-
tion process more acceptable to minority disputants.
But how can we ensure that consumer or employee advocacy groups,
or groups created by plaintiffs’ lawyers, can stand in the place of the
union to propose inclusion of arbitrators from diverse backgrounds on
arbitrator panels and play a role in their selection? Bill Gould, former
Chair of the NLRB and an experienced arbitrator, suggested that em-
ployees’ representatives, in particular, could be in a position to identify
arbitrators for rosterspanels and, later, for selection. He believed that,
post-Gilmer, “the plaintiffs’ bar in most major cities is able to act as an
adequate surrogate for organized labor. That is to say, counsel, like union
representatives, will pass information about their experience and judg-
ments about particular arbitrators to one another just as employers do in
both settings.”186 A recent study of AAA consumer arbitration cases sug-
gests that this may be happening, at least in consumer arbitration. In a
study of over 5,000 consumer complaints filed with AAA between 2009
and 2013, the authors found that “repeat-playing plaintiffs’ lawyers” may
have “growing clout” in the arbitrator selection process.187 These lawyers
could work with AAA and business counsel to establish a more diverse
panel of arbitrators who could then be assigned randomly to cases.  Even
if a rosterpanel were not possible, one would hope that the growing influ-
ence of repeat-playing plaintiffs’ lawyers will serve to ensure selection of
arbitrators with more diverse backgrounds, as lawyers will likely work to
186. William B. Gould IV, Kissing Cousins?: The Federal Arbitration Act and Modern
Labor Arbitration, 55 EMORY L.J. 609, 659 (2006) (expressing concern that an employee
who cannot afford counsel might have difficulty selecting an arbitrator because he or she
would be unlikely to have access to the resources necessary to make a knowledgeable
choice). But see Alexander J.S. Colvin, An Empirical Study of Employment Arbitration:
Case Outcomes and Processes, 8 J. OF LEGAL STUDIES 1, 31 (2011). In this article, Colvin
found that repeat player employers had an advantage in arbitration involving employees.
One of the reasons for a repeat player advantage, Colvin concluded, was that the “plaintiff
attorney bar” was not able “to play a substitute role as a repeat player on behalf of em-
ployees in employer arbitration akin to the role played by unions in labor arbitration.” Id.
Colvin speculated that plaintiff attorneys might be able to play this role if the time came
when there were a “sufficient number of plaintiff attorneys experienced in employment
arbitration accessible to employees to be able to counteract employer advantages in this
area.” Id.
187. See generally Horton & Chandrasekher, supra note 177. Horton’s research de-
bunks the belief that arbitral bias against the one-shot players is prevalent. According to
Horton’s research, there is “little proof that private judges are prejudiced against consum-
ers. In fact, our research goes further and casts doubt on existing evidence of arbitral bias.”
Id. at 120–21. There is also some doubt as to the continued existence of the repeat player
influence in arbitration. See id. at 121. According to Horton, repeat players do not have as
much control over the arbitration process as they did in the past. Id. 1,279 different arbitra-
tors (in part because of the AAA arbitrator appointment process) presided over 4,839
arbitrations. Id. at 91, 121. Thus, the authors concluded that “companies no longer have
much control over the identity of the private judge.” Id. at 121. Although Horton did not
study the identity of the arbitrators, one might also imagine that more minority and female
arbitrators presided over these arbitrations, given that so many different arbitrators were
assigned to resolve disputes.
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select arbitrators who they believe to share experiences and beliefs simi-
lar to their clients.
Organized plaintiffs’ lawyers and increased use of direct arbitrator ap-
pointment and arbitrator panels may well lead to increased diversity
among arbitrators actually appointed to hear consumer and employment
disputes. If increasing diversity among arbitrators is integral to ensuring
the procedural integrity of the arbitration process, then arbitral organiza-
tions should push businesses to draft arbitration clauses that authorize
arbitrator appointment or permanent panels. As long as arbitral organi-
zations are committed to maintaining diverse rosters of arbitrators, this
approach will ensure that a much larger percentage of arbitrators from
diverse backgrounds are appointed to hear cases, rather than simply lan-
guish on the arbitrator rosters, never to be chosen.
V. CONCLUSION
Arbitration is a structured process that, in the past twenty years has
become increasingly formal to address perceived inequities among parties
who participate in it, particularly one-shot players facing repeat players.
These improvements to arbitration, including reduced filing and arbitra-
tor fees and greater due process, rebut the assertion that the arbitration
process disadvantages minority or one-shot disputants. And the beauty of
arbitration is that its structure is amenable to additional reform that
might address perceived and real threats to justice that may emanate
from an informal forum. Among other reforms, the addition of a pub-
lished reasoned written opinion and diversification of the arbitrator corps
might ultimately make arbitration a preferable forum for minority and
one-shot disputants given its already low cost and efficient resolution pro-
cess. Although arbitration is not a “baby,” having been around since bib-
lical times, it should nevertheless not be thrown out with the bathwater,
for it has the potential to provide minority disputants, particularly those
facing a well-heeled opponent, the ability to access and, perhaps, obtain
justice, an objective rarely achieved by those with few resources in a
traditional courtroom.188
188. Stipanowich, supra note 131, at 37 (noting that the litigation forum does not pro-
vide a level playing field for those with limited resources; time and cost are considerable,
and the ideal of justice is rarely met).
